Lucy O'Brien argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. Clearly written, with rigorous discussion of rival views, this book will be of interest to anyone working in the philosophy of mind and action.
Lucy O'Brien argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference and self-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. Clearly written, with rigorous discussion of rival views, this book will be of interest to anyone working in the philosophy of mind and action.
Lucy O'Brien is a Reader in Philosophy at University College London
Inhaltsangabe
Preface Part I. 1: Introduction 2: Arguments for the No-Reference View of 'I' 3: Perceptual Models of First Person Reference 4: The Self-Reference Rule 5: The Agency Account 6: Agent's Awareness and Knowledge of Our Mental Actions Part II 7: Introduction 8: What are Actions? 9: On Knowing One's Own Physical Actions 10: Bodily Awareness 11: Bodily Awareness and Self-Knowledge
Preface Part I. 1: Introduction 2: Arguments for the No-Reference View of 'I' 3: Perceptual Models of First Person Reference 4: The Self-Reference Rule 5: The Agency Account 6: Agent's Awareness and Knowledge of Our Mental Actions Part II 7: Introduction 8: What are Actions? 9: On Knowing One's Own Physical Actions 10: Bodily Awareness 11: Bodily Awareness and Self-Knowledge
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