This volume attempts to solve a grave problem about critical self-reflection. Psychological studies indicate not just that we are bad at detecting our own "ego-threatening" thoughts; they also suggest that we are ignorant of even our ordinary thoughts. However, self-reflection presupposes an ability to know one's own thoughts. So if ignorance is
This volume attempts to solve a grave problem about critical self-reflection. Psychological studies indicate not just that we are bad at detecting our own "ego-threatening" thoughts; they also suggest that we are ignorant of even our ordinary thoughts. However, self-reflection presupposes an ability to know one's own thoughts. So if ignorance is
T. Parent is a Visiting Assistant Professor in the philosophy department at Virginia Polytechnic and State University. He came to Virginia Tech in August 2009, also the month the Ph.D. was granted (UNC, Chapel Hill). Primarily, he works on the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and meta/ontology. His publications on such topics have appeared in Philosophical Studies, the Journal of Philosophy, and the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, among others. He lives with his wife in Blacksburg, Virginia.
Inhaltsangabe
Part I: Preliminaries Preamble: Is Philosophy Anti-Scientific? 1. Introduction: How is Rational Self-Reflection Possible? 2. The Empirical Case against Infallibility Part II: Knowledge of Thought 3. Infallibility in Knowing What One Thinks 4. Objection 1: It's Apriori that Water Exists 5. Objection 2: Thought Switching 6. Content Externalism Does Not Imply Wayward Reflection Part III: Knowledge of Judging 7. Infallibility in Knowing What One Judges 8. Infallibility in Knowing What One Expresses 9. Objection 1: It's Apriori that the Mental Exists 10. Objection 2: Attitude Switching 11. Attitude Confabulation Does Not Imply Wayward Reflection Part IV: Denoument 12. Conclusion: How Rational Self-Reflection is Possible
Part I: Preliminaries Preamble: Is Philosophy Anti-Scientific? 1. Introduction: How is Rational Self-Reflection Possible? 2. The Empirical Case against Infallibility Part II: Knowledge of Thought 3. Infallibility in Knowing What One Thinks 4. Objection 1: It's Apriori that Water Exists 5. Objection 2: Thought Switching 6. Content Externalism Does Not Imply Wayward Reflection Part III: Knowledge of Judging 7. Infallibility in Knowing What One Judges 8. Infallibility in Knowing What One Expresses 9. Objection 1: It's Apriori that the Mental Exists 10. Objection 2: Attitude Switching 11. Attitude Confabulation Does Not Imply Wayward Reflection Part IV: Denoument 12. Conclusion: How Rational Self-Reflection is Possible
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