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Kit Fine argues for a fundamentally new approach to the study of representation in language and thought. His key idea is that there may be representational relationships between expressions or elements of thought that are not grounded in the intrinsic representational features of the expressions or elements themselves. This idea is shown to lead to solutions to many of the standard puzzles in the area - Frege's identity puzzle, Kripke's puzzle about belief, and Moore's paradox of analysis. It is also shown to lead to a more defensible form of direct reference theory - one that is immune to…mehr

Produktbeschreibung
Kit Fine argues for a fundamentally new approach to the study of representation in language and thought. His key idea is that there may be representational relationships between expressions or elements of thought that are not grounded in the intrinsic representational features of the expressions or elements themselves. This idea is shown to lead to solutions to many of the standard puzzles in the area - Frege's identity puzzle, Kripke's puzzle about belief, and Moore's paradox of analysis. It is also shown to lead to a more defensible form of direct reference theory - one that is immune to many of the objections that the Fregeans have levelled against it. Based upon the first Brown/Blackwell lecture series and the John Locke lectures, this ground-breaking work is essential reading for anyone interested in the general nature of representation.
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Autorenporträt
Kit Fine is Silver Professor of Philosophy and Mathematics at New York University, and specializes in Metaphysics, Logic, and Philosophy of Language. He has held fellowships from the Guggenheim Foundation and the American Council of Learned Societies and is a former editor of the Journal of Symbolic Logic. He is the author of Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers (2005), and the co-author of Worlds, Times and Selves and Reasoning with Arbitrary Objects (Blackwell, 1985). He has also written papers in ancient philosophy, linguistics, computer science, and economic theory, in addition to the papers in his central fields of interest.
Rezensionen
"Combines careful, detailed argumentation with inspiration and synoptic vision for the bigger picture. ... One can reasonably expect Fine's book to be a spur for thinking about these issues for many years to come." (Mind, October 2009)"With characteristic brilliance and rigor, Kit Fine advancesa radically new conception of semantic structure that casts lightfrom an unexpected direction on the nature of compositionality andthe theory of direct reference."
Tim Williamson, Oxford University

"How can two sentences represent the world as beingprecisely the same way, yet differ in meaning, and expresspropositions that are rationally believed in differentcircumstances? Echoing themes initially broached by suchphilosophers as Hilary Putnam and David Kaplan, Kit Fine answerswith a novel conception of semantics uniting the two-sidedconnection of meaning with mind and world, and culminating in aningenious, representationalist theory designed to incorporatecontemporary Millianism while accommodating traditional Fregeanintuitions. A delight to read, the book will be mined for its ideasand arguments for years to come."
Scott Soames, University of Southern California