Kit Fine argues for a fundamentally new approach to the study of representation in language and thought. His key idea is that there may be representational relationships between expressions or elements of thought that are not grounded in the intrinsic representational features of the expressions or elements themselves. This idea is shown to lead to solutions to many of the standard puzzles in the area - Frege's identity puzzle, Kripke's puzzle about belief, and Moore's paradox of analysis. It is also shown to lead to a more defensible form of direct reference theory - one that is immune to many of the objections that the Fregeans have leveled against it. Based upon the first Brown/Blackwell lecture series and the John Locke lectures, this ground-breaking work is essential reading for anyone interested in the general nature of representation.
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"With characteristic brilliance and rigor, Kit Fine advances aradically new conception of semantic structure that casts lightfrom an unexpected direction on the nature of compositionality andthe theory of direct reference."
-Tim Williamson, Oxford University
"How can two sentences represent the world as being preciselythe same way, yet differ in meaning, and express propositions thatare rationally believed in different circumstances? Echoing themesinitially broached by such philosophers as Hilary Putnam and DavidKaplan, Kit Fine answers with a novel conception of semanticsuniting the two-sided connection of meaning with mind and world,and culminating in an ingenious, representationalist theorydesigned to incorporate contemporary Millianism while accommodatingtraditional Fregean intuitions. A delight to read, the book will bemined for its ideas and arguments for years to come."
-Scott Soames, University of SouthernCalifornia
-Tim Williamson, Oxford University
"How can two sentences represent the world as being preciselythe same way, yet differ in meaning, and express propositions thatare rationally believed in different circumstances? Echoing themesinitially broached by such philosophers as Hilary Putnam and DavidKaplan, Kit Fine answers with a novel conception of semanticsuniting the two-sided connection of meaning with mind and world,and culminating in an ingenious, representationalist theorydesigned to incorporate contemporary Millianism while accommodatingtraditional Fregean intuitions. A delight to read, the book will bemined for its ideas and arguments for years to come."
-Scott Soames, University of SouthernCalifornia