This book is a timely reflection on Brian Loar's enduring influence on the philosophy of mind and language. This volume features essays on Loar's work in philosophy of language, especially the relations between semantics and psychology, on content in the philosophy of mind, and on the metaphysics of intentionality and consciousness.
This book is a timely reflection on Brian Loar's enduring influence on the philosophy of mind and language. This volume features essays on Loar's work in philosophy of language, especially the relations between semantics and psychology, on content in the philosophy of mind, and on the metaphysics of intentionality and consciousness.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Arthur Sullivan is an Associate Professor at Memorial University of Newfoundland, Canada. He works primarily in the Philosophy of Language, and in overlapping parts of Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Cognitive Science. He is the author of Reference and Structure (Routledge, 2013), The Constitutive A Priori (2018), and dozens of published articles.
Inhaltsangabe
Introduction Arthur Sullivan Part I: Philosophy of Language, and Relations between Semantics and Psychology 1. Intention Recognition as the Mechanism of Human Communication Daniel Harris 2. Loar, Donnellan, and Frege on Descriptions John Perry 3. Modes of Presentation in Attitude Reports Francois Recanati 4. Expression-Meaning and Vagueness Stephen Schiffer 5. Limning the External Dimensions of Meaning Arthur Sullivan Part II: On Content in the Philosophy of Mind 6. Relational vs. Adverbial Conceptions of Phenomenal Intentionality David Bourget 7. Phenomenal Intentionality and the Perception/Cognition Divide Uriah Kriegel 8. Cognitive Phenomenology, Sensory Phenomenology, and Rationality Michelle Montague 9. Loar's Compromised Internalism David Pitt 10. Loar on Lemons: the Particularity of Perception and Singular Perceptual Content Mark Sainsbury 11. The Sense of 'Looks' Michael Tye Part III: The Metaphysics of Intentionality and Consciousness 12. Hard, Harder, Hardest Katalin Balog 13. "Phenomenal States" and the Scope of the Phenomenal Concepts Strategy Janet Levin 14. Phenomenal Concepts and the First-Person Perspective Joseph Levine 15. The Non-Primacy of Subjective Intentionality Georges Rey
Introduction Arthur Sullivan Part I: Philosophy of Language, and Relations between Semantics and Psychology 1. Intention Recognition as the Mechanism of Human Communication Daniel Harris 2. Loar, Donnellan, and Frege on Descriptions John Perry 3. Modes of Presentation in Attitude Reports Francois Recanati 4. Expression-Meaning and Vagueness Stephen Schiffer 5. Limning the External Dimensions of Meaning Arthur Sullivan Part II: On Content in the Philosophy of Mind 6. Relational vs. Adverbial Conceptions of Phenomenal Intentionality David Bourget 7. Phenomenal Intentionality and the Perception/Cognition Divide Uriah Kriegel 8. Cognitive Phenomenology, Sensory Phenomenology, and Rationality Michelle Montague 9. Loar's Compromised Internalism David Pitt 10. Loar on Lemons: the Particularity of Perception and Singular Perceptual Content Mark Sainsbury 11. The Sense of 'Looks' Michael Tye Part III: The Metaphysics of Intentionality and Consciousness 12. Hard, Harder, Hardest Katalin Balog 13. "Phenomenal States" and the Scope of the Phenomenal Concepts Strategy Janet Levin 14. Phenomenal Concepts and the First-Person Perspective Joseph Levine 15. The Non-Primacy of Subjective Intentionality Georges Rey
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