Gary W. Cox is a professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego. In addition to numerous articles in the areas of legislative and electoral politics, he is author of The Efficient Secret (winner of the Samuel H. Beer dissertation prize in 1983), coauthor of Legislative Leviathan (winner of the Richard F. Fenno Prize in 1993), and author of Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems (1997), which was awarded APSA's awards for the best book in political science (Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award), the best book in comparative politics (Gregory Luebbert Prize), and for the best book in political economy. His latest book, Elbridge Gerry's Salamander, analyzes the political consequences of the reapportionment revolution in the United States. Cox is a former Guggenheim Fellow and was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1996.
1. Introduction
Part I. Why Party Government?: 2. Procedural Cartel theory
Part II. Negative Agenda Power: 3. Cartel agenda model vs. floor agenda model
4. The primacy of Reed's rules in house organization
5. Final passage votes
6. The costs of agenda control
7. The textbook congress and the committee on rules
8. The bills reported from committee
9. Which way does policy move?
Part III. The Consequences of Positive Agenda Power and Conditional Party Government: 10. Positive agenda power
11. Conclusion.
