Setting the Agenda - Cox, Gary W.; McCubbins, Mathew D.
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Short description/annotation
Demonstrates that the majority party seizes agenda control at nearly every stage of the legislative process.
Main description
Scholars of the U.S. House disagree over the importance of political parties in organizing the legislative process. On the one hand, non-partisan theories stress how congressional organization serves members' non-partisan goals. On the other hand, partisan theories argue that the House is organized to serve the collective interests of the majority party. This book advances our partisan theory and presents a series of empirical tests…mehr

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Produktbeschreibung
Short description/annotation
Demonstrates that the majority party seizes agenda control at nearly every stage of the legislative process.

Main description
Scholars of the U.S. House disagree over the importance of political parties in organizing the legislative process. On the one hand, non-partisan theories stress how congressional organization serves members' non-partisan goals. On the other hand, partisan theories argue that the House is organized to serve the collective interests of the majority party. This book advances our partisan theory and presents a series of empirical tests of that theory's predictions (pitted against others). It considers why procedural cartels form, arguing that agenda power is naturally subject to cartelization in busy legislatures. It argues that the majority party has cartelized agenda power in the U.S. House since the adoption of Reed's rules in 1890. The evidence demonstrates that the majority party seizes agenda control at nearly every stage of the legislative process in order to prevent bills that the party dislikes from reaching the floor.

Table of contents:
1. Introduction; Part I. Why Party Government(?)33;: 2. Procedural Cartel theory; Part II. Negative Agenda Power: 3. Cartel agenda model vs. floor agenda model; 4. The primacy of Reed's rules in house organization; 5. Final passage votes; 6. The costs of agenda control; 7. The textbook congress and the committee on rules; 8. The bills reported from committee; 9. Which way does policy move(?)33;; Part III. The Consequences of Positive Agenda Power and Conditional Party Government: 10. Positive agenda power; 11. Conclusion.
Autorenporträt
Gary W. Cox is a professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego. In addition to numerous articles in the areas of legislative and electoral politics, he is author of The Efficient Secret (winner of the Samuel H. Beer dissertation prize in 1983), coauthor of Legislative Leviathan (winner of the Richard F. Fenno Prize in 1993), and author of Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems (1997), which was awarded APSA's awards for the best book in political science (Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award), the best book in comparative politics (Gregory Luebbert Prize), and for the best book in political economy. His latest book, Elbridge Gerry's Salamander, analyzes the political consequences of the reapportionment revolution in the United States. Cox is a former Guggenheim Fellow and was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1996.