This work argues that the successful implementation of a share economy requires some substantial changes in the typical structure of property rights of modern capitalism. Topics covered range from the demand for capital in a share economy, to wage bargaining.
This work argues that the successful implementation of a share economy requires some substantial changes in the typical structure of property rights of modern capitalism. Topics covered range from the demand for capital in a share economy, to wage bargaining.
Part 1: A historical precedent - sharecropping. Part 2 Basic models: alternative sharing schemes; revenue sharing; team piece rate; sliding scale; a wage-fund system. Part 3 The free access system. Part 4 The demand for capital in the share economy: excess demand for factors in long-run equilibrium; the demand for capital with fixed compensation parameters. Part 5 Wage bargaining in the share economy: employment-restraining agreements under revenue sharing; revenue sharing in an insider-outsider model; revenue sharing in a monopoly union model. Part 6 Efficiency eages in the share economy: the supply of effort in a share system; profit maximisation; efficiency wage; and the demand for labour; market equilibrium and comparative statics; gains and losses from revenue sharing. Part 7 Risk sharing in the share economy: privately superior wage contracts; privately superior share contracts. Part 8 A discriminating share system: Meade's blueprint; the DLCP at work-problems and complications; system stability and property rights.
Part 1: A historical precedent - sharecropping. Part 2 Basic models: alternative sharing schemes; revenue sharing; team piece rate; sliding scale; a wage-fund system. Part 3 The free access system. Part 4 The demand for capital in the share economy: excess demand for factors in long-run equilibrium; the demand for capital with fixed compensation parameters. Part 5 Wage bargaining in the share economy: employment-restraining agreements under revenue sharing; revenue sharing in an insider-outsider model; revenue sharing in a monopoly union model. Part 6 Efficiency eages in the share economy: the supply of effort in a share system; profit maximisation; efficiency wage; and the demand for labour; market equilibrium and comparative statics; gains and losses from revenue sharing. Part 7 Risk sharing in the share economy: privately superior wage contracts; privately superior share contracts. Part 8 A discriminating share system: Meade's blueprint; the DLCP at work-problems and complications; system stability and property rights.
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