Brian Skyrms applies adaptive dynamics (of cultural evolution and individual learning) to social theory, investigating altruism, spite, fairness, trust, division of labor, and signaling. Correlation is seen to be fundamental. Spontaneous emergence of social structure and of signaling systems are examined in the context of learning dynamics.
Brian Skyrms applies adaptive dynamics (of cultural evolution and individual learning) to social theory, investigating altruism, spite, fairness, trust, division of labor, and signaling. Correlation is seen to be fundamental. Spontaneous emergence of social structure and of signaling systems are examined in the context of learning dynamics.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Brian Skyrms is Distinguished Professor of Logic and Philosophy of Science and Economics at the University of California, Irvine. His interests cover a range of topics, including the evolution of conventions, the social contract, inductive logic, decision theory, rational deliberation, the metaphysics of logical atomism, causality, and truth. He is the author of Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information (OUP, 2010) and From Zeno to Arbitrage: Essays on Quantity. Coherence, and Induction (OUP, 2012).
Inhaltsangabe
* Introduction * Part I: Correlation and the Social Contract * Introduction to part I * 1: Evolution and the Social Contract * Part II: Importance of Dynamics * Introduction to part II * 2: Trust, Risk, and the Social Contract * 3: with Jason Alexander: Bargaining with Neighbors: Is Justice Contagious? * 4: Stability and Explanatory Significance of Some Simple Evolutionary Models * 5: Dynamics of Conformist Bias * 6: Chaos and the Explanatory Significance of Equilibrium: Strange Attractors in Evolutionary Game Dynamics * 7: with Jorge Pacheco, Francisco Santos and Max Souza: Evolutionary Dynamics of Collective Action in N-person Stag Hunt Dilemmas * 8: with Peter Vanderschraaf: Learning to Take Turns * 9: with Kevin Zollman: Evolutionary Considerations in the Framing of Social Norms * Part III: Dynamic Networks * Introduction to part III * 10: with Robin Pemantle: Learning to Network * 11: with Robin Pemantle: A Dynamic Model of Social Network Formation * 12: with Robin Pemantle: Network Formation by Reinforcement Learning: The Long and the Medium Run * 13: with Robin Pemantle: Time to Absorption in Discounted Reinforcement Models * Part IV: Dynamics of Signals * Introduction to part IV * 14: with Raffaele Argiento, Robin Pemantle and Stanislav Volkov: Learning to Signal: Analysis of a Micro-Level Reinforcement Model * 15: with Jason McKenzie Alexander and Sandy L. Zabell: Inventing New Signals * 16: Signals, Evolution and the Explanatory Power of Transient Information * 17: with Francesco Santos and Jorge Pacheco: Co-Evolution of Pre-Play Signaling and Cooperation * 18: Evolution of Signaling Systems with Multiple Senders and Receivers * Index
* Introduction * Part I: Correlation and the Social Contract * Introduction to part I * 1: Evolution and the Social Contract * Part II: Importance of Dynamics * Introduction to part II * 2: Trust, Risk, and the Social Contract * 3: with Jason Alexander: Bargaining with Neighbors: Is Justice Contagious? * 4: Stability and Explanatory Significance of Some Simple Evolutionary Models * 5: Dynamics of Conformist Bias * 6: Chaos and the Explanatory Significance of Equilibrium: Strange Attractors in Evolutionary Game Dynamics * 7: with Jorge Pacheco, Francisco Santos and Max Souza: Evolutionary Dynamics of Collective Action in N-person Stag Hunt Dilemmas * 8: with Peter Vanderschraaf: Learning to Take Turns * 9: with Kevin Zollman: Evolutionary Considerations in the Framing of Social Norms * Part III: Dynamic Networks * Introduction to part III * 10: with Robin Pemantle: Learning to Network * 11: with Robin Pemantle: A Dynamic Model of Social Network Formation * 12: with Robin Pemantle: Network Formation by Reinforcement Learning: The Long and the Medium Run * 13: with Robin Pemantle: Time to Absorption in Discounted Reinforcement Models * Part IV: Dynamics of Signals * Introduction to part IV * 14: with Raffaele Argiento, Robin Pemantle and Stanislav Volkov: Learning to Signal: Analysis of a Micro-Level Reinforcement Model * 15: with Jason McKenzie Alexander and Sandy L. Zabell: Inventing New Signals * 16: Signals, Evolution and the Explanatory Power of Transient Information * 17: with Francesco Santos and Jorge Pacheco: Co-Evolution of Pre-Play Signaling and Cooperation * 18: Evolution of Signaling Systems with Multiple Senders and Receivers * Index
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