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This study examines Soviet surprise within the context of tactical warfare. It assesses Soviet military art in relationship to their current surprise doctrine, defines the elements of surprise and reviews their historical use. It also discusses the advantages of surprise operations and those the Soviets expect if used against NATO. The main body of the study is concerned with how the Soviets will achieve surprise and how we can prevent or counter it. A discussion of Soviet organization, methods of execution, counter-reconnaissance, radio electronic combat, intelligence collection, and other items such as the use of deception to support surprise operations is included. It states that U.S. commanders and intelligence personnel must understand the Soviets'; options, presents ways to improve the intelligence system so it can detect surprise, and discusses actions leaders can take to assist in this process. The final section presents ways to counter surprise. The study concludes that Soviet forces will use surprise to support their tactical operations. This tactical use will be integrated with the operational and strategic surprise plan. U.S. detection, prevention and countering will depend on intelligence and operations personnel understanding the battlefield and its ambiguities.