This book focuses instead on the central role that intelligence collection systems play in promoting arms control and disarmament. Graham and Hansen discuss the capabilities of technical systems and shed a much-needed light on the process of verifying how the world harnesses the proliferation of nuclear arms and the continual drive for advancements in technology.
This book focuses instead on the central role that intelligence collection systems play in promoting arms control and disarmament. Graham and Hansen discuss the capabilities of technical systems and shed a much-needed light on the process of verifying how the world harnesses the proliferation of nuclear arms and the continual drive for advancements in technology.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr. is chairman of the Cypress Fund for Peace and Security in Washington, D.C. He served as general counsel of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for fifteen years and was President Clinton's special assistant for arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament. Keith Hansen is consulting professor in international relations at Stanford University and has spent thirty-five years in US national security deliberations and strategic nuclear arms control negotiations.
Inhaltsangabe
Foreword by Robert M. Huffstutler Preface and Acknowledgments Introduction 1. To Verity or Not to Verify 2. Soviet Secrecy Fuels the Arms Race and Inhibits Verification 3. U.S. Efforts to Understand Soviet Military Forces and Capabilities 4. Strategic Arms Control Legitimizes Space-Based Reconnaissance 5. Intelligence Support to Arms Control Activities 6. National Technical Means of Verification Takes Center Stage 7. "National Technical Means" Goes Multilateral 8. Monitoring the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 9. Conclusion Postscript Appendixes A. Glossary of Acronyms and Terms B. Texts of NTM Provisions in Arms Control Agreements C. Chronology of Key U.S. Reconnaissance Capabilities D. U.S. Atomic Energy Detection System (USAEDS) E. CTBT International Monitoring System F. U.S. Intelligence Community Notes Bibliography About the Authors Index
Foreword by Robert M. Huffstutler Preface and Acknowledgments Introduction 1. To Verity or Not to Verify 2. Soviet Secrecy Fuels the Arms Race and Inhibits Verification 3. U.S. Efforts to Understand Soviet Military Forces and Capabilities 4. Strategic Arms Control Legitimizes Space-Based Reconnaissance 5. Intelligence Support to Arms Control Activities 6. National Technical Means of Verification Takes Center Stage 7. "National Technical Means" Goes Multilateral 8. Monitoring the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 9. Conclusion Postscript Appendixes A. Glossary of Acronyms and Terms B. Texts of NTM Provisions in Arms Control Agreements C. Chronology of Key U.S. Reconnaissance Capabilities D. U.S. Atomic Energy Detection System (USAEDS) E. CTBT International Monitoring System F. U.S. Intelligence Community Notes Bibliography About the Authors Index
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