Thomas Juneau

Squandered Opportunity

Neoclassical Realism and Iranian Foreign Policy

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Thomas Juneau is an Assistant Professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Stanford University Press
• Seitenzahl: 296
• Erscheinungstermin: 19. Mai 2015
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 20mm
• Gewicht: 522g
• ISBN-13: 9780804793056
• ISBN-10: 0804793050
• Artikelnr.: 41750483

Autorenporträt

Thomas Juneau is an Assistant Professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa.

Inhaltsangabe

Contents and Abstracts
Introduction
chapter abstract
The introduction sets the stage by explaining how the book offers an
original reading of Iran's foreign policy: why and how Tehran failed to
seize the opportunities it faced after 2001. It starts by briefly
demonstrating that various international relations theories fail to explain
the underwhelming nature of Iran's foreign policy. It then outlines a
unique variant of neoclassical realism, both in general terms and in terms
of its specific application to the Iranian case. It then introduces the
book's research objectives and working hypotheses, followed by a brief
methodological discussion.
1Neoclassical Realism
chapter abstract
This chapter reviews the literature on neoclassical realism, and explains
its evolution as well as its strengths and weaknesses. Neoclassical
realists agree with other realists that power is the chief determinant of
foreign policy. Yet a reliance solely on structural factors - a state's
position in the international distribution of power - cannot account for
underwhelming performances, structure explains the context in which a state
operates but says little about the content of foreign policy. Neoclassical
realists thus posit that domestic factors act as intervening variables or
'transmission belts' converting systemic pressures into choices. In
addition, neoclassical realism is a theory of mistakes differentiating
ideal or optimal foreign policy (responding solely to structural pressures)
from actual, sub-optimal choices, which arise as a result of the filtering
effect of domestic pathologies.
2From Power to Foreign Policy: The Causal Chain
chapter abstract
This chapter proposes modifications to neoclassical realism, labeling the
result the strategic analysis variant. It is possible to view this variant
in terms of its position on a continuum built around a tenet of realism,
that capabilities shape intentions. At one end, structural realism predicts
that states faced with a power vacuum seek to expand their interests
abroad. At the other end, the strategic analysis variant increases accuracy
while remaining within the confines of realism: it fragments power to
understand how shifts in its components affect foreign policy, it increases
the number and specificity of intervening variables to reflect their
filtering role, it conceptualizes foreign policy more precisely by
separating it into four components (power/security/influence-maximization,
national interests, strategies, and consequences), and it systematizes the
concepts of actual and ideal foreign policy and clarifies how states suffer
consequences as a result of gaps between ideal and actual versions.
3Power
chapter abstract
This chapter introduces the structural context driving Iranian foreign
policy. Iran, to begin, benefits from a strong pool of potential power
assets, by dint of its geography, natural resources, and population. In
addition, Iran faced a window of opportunity after 2001, a power advantage
which primarily arose with the collapse of rival regimes in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Other factors including the rise in oil prices and the success of
allies such as Hamas and Hezbollah also helped create favourable
conditions. Yet this advantage was brittle and unsustainable. A large
proportion of the growth in Iran's power was accounted for by
unconventional elements: asymmetric military capabilities, the
attractiveness of its rejectionist model and alliances with non-state
actors, while hard aspects - wealth and conventional military assets - grew
in absolute terms but stagnated in relative terms.
4Domestic Pathologies
chapter abstract
Systemic pressures are filtered through domestic processes, explaining the
conversion from possible - the range of feasible outcomes shaped by power -
to actual choices. Three intervening variables matter: status, identity and
factional politics. There is a discrepancy, first, between Iran's
aspiration to regional power status and its perception that the status
ascribed to it is unbecoming of what it believes is its rightful place in
the regional order, it suffers from a status discrepancy. This is a source
of revisionism, but remains indeterminate. To achieve greater specificity,
the second variable consists of the Iranian regime's rejectionist identity,
which specifies Iran's interests by ranking alternatives and shaping
decisions. The balance of power among regime factions - the third
intervening variable - constantly evolves but remains within the parameters
of the Islamic Republic's identity. That is, power, aspirations and
identity shape an increasingly precise set of options, bargaining among
factions subsequently determines which are selected.
5Iran's Policy in Iraq
chapter abstract
Iran has major interests in Iraq: geography ensures that the security of
each is partly dependent on the power and ambitions of the other. In Iraq,
Iran's power was less constrained than in the Arab-Israeli conflict, with
conventional elements of power playing a salient role. Iran had genuine
security concerns emanating from the presence of US troops and instability
in Iraq. There was thus less scope for agency as structural pressures
pushed and shoved Iran more compellingly. Tehran partly accomplished its
objectives: it positioned itself as an indispensable player in Iraq and was
instrumental in the establishment of a stable but weak Iraqi government
devoid of anti-Iranian biases. Nonetheless, Iran's performance has been
sub-optimal, though less than in other issue-areas. This smaller
discrepancy was due to the limited role of domestic pathologies in shaping
policies: there was therefore less deviation from optimal,
structurally-induced outcomes.
6Iran and the Arab-Israeli Conflict
chapter abstract
Iran's rising power pushes it towards greater assertiveness in the
Arab-Israeli conflict. Yet solely on the basis of structural pressures,
there is limited security for Iran to maximize: it does not share a border
with Israel and economic ties are limited. Structure thus provided strong
but ambiguous signals, leaving scope for domestic pathologies to distort
policy. The combination of rising power and status discrepancy tells us
that Iran will be an assertive and revisionist power, while regime identity
specifies the rejectionist nature of this revisionism. As the factional
balance increasingly favoured hard-liners, policy further tilted towards
rejectionism. Yet Iran only has a narrow set of tools, especially the
appeal of its rejectionism and its ties to like-minded actors. This limits
the breadth of the impact it can have on the conflict, and is insufficient
to shape the regional order in the revisionist direction it envisions.
7Iran's Nuclear Program
chapter abstract
Driven by its rising power, an assertive Iran progressed along the nuclear
path. Structural pressures were strong but indeterminate, however, failing
to push Iran as compellingly as in Iraq. This allowed domestic pathologies
to influence policy. Iran suffers from a status discrepancy: it wants to
reap the benefits associated with joining the nuclear club but is denied
the opportunity. It is thus dissatisfied with the nuclear order. The
regime's identity and the evolution of the factional balance in favour of
conservatives and hard-liners specify how revisionist options were narrowed
towards rejectionism. Tehran has been able to gain influence thanks to its
nuclear program, more than in the Arab-Israeli conflict but less than in
Iraq. Most importantly, the program promises future benefits.
Paradoxically, Iran also suffers significant consequences because of its
choices: its economy is increasingly suffocated by sanctions, while the
country suffers from growing isolation.
Conclusion
chapter abstract
The Conclusion synthesizes the results by discussing how Iran's power,
security and influence, despite some successes, remain well below their
potential. The situation, moreover, is likely to get worse: Iran's power
will face growing constraints in coming years. Next, the conclusion argues
that the analysis validates the view of structural realism as a normative
theory - accounting for how states should behave - and of neoclassical
realism as a theory of mistakes, accounting for the gap between ideal and
actual policies through its integration of domestic processes. This arises
in part because of the distinction between rationality and optimality:
neoclassical realism provides a framework explaining why choices are
rational but not necessarily optimal. After reflecting on the relevance of
other pillars of the framework - complexity, eclecticism, dynamism,
path-dependency and foreign policy strategies - the conclusion offers
prescriptions for Iran to maximize its power, security and influence.