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This book examines, from a Wittgensteinian perspective, a version of eliminative materialism formerly propounded by Richard Rorty. The author argues that this view about the nature and existence of minds and mental states, which treats them as proto-scientific theoretical entities, is false, and assumes too crude an understanding of our day-to-day use of mental language. The author also develops positive conclusions in the philosophy of mind from a criticism of these underlying assumptions, setting out an alternative position derived from Wittgenstein's notion of criteria.

Produktbeschreibung
This book examines, from a Wittgensteinian perspective, a version of eliminative materialism formerly propounded by Richard Rorty. The author argues that this view about the nature and existence of minds and mental states, which treats them as proto-scientific theoretical entities, is false, and assumes too crude an understanding of our day-to-day use of mental language. The author also develops positive conclusions in the philosophy of mind from a criticism of these underlying assumptions, setting out an alternative position derived from Wittgenstein's notion of criteria.
Autorenporträt
John Black lehrte bis zu seiner Pensionierung im Jahr 2017 Liberal Studies und Philosophie an der Vancouver Island University. Zu seinen Forschungsinteressen gehörten der spätere Wittgenstein, die Philosophie des Geistes, die platonische Wissenschaft und die Ästhetik des 18.