Kent Greenwalt's second volume on aspects of legal interpretation analyzes statutory and common law interpretation, suggesting that multiple factors are important for each, and that the relation between them influences both. The book argues against any simple "textualism," claiming that even reader understanding of statutes depends partly on perceived intent. In respect to common law interpretation, use of reasoning by analogy is defended and any simple dichotomy of "holding" and "dictum" is resisted.
Kent Greenwalt's second volume on aspects of legal interpretation analyzes statutory and common law interpretation, suggesting that multiple factors are important for each, and that the relation between them influences both. The book argues against any simple "textualism," claiming that even reader understanding of statutes depends partly on perceived intent. In respect to common law interpretation, use of reasoning by analogy is defended and any simple dichotomy of "holding" and "dictum" is resisted.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Kent Greenawalt is University Professor at Columbia University, teaching at Columbia Law School. His publications include Religion and the Constitution, Vol. 1, Free Exercise and Fairness; Religion and the Constitution, Vol. 2, Establishment and Fairness; Conflicts of Law and Morality; Religious Convictions and Political Choice; Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language; Law and Objectivity; Fighting Words; Private Consciences and Public Reasons; Statutory Interpretation: Twenty Questions ; and Does God Belong in Public Schools?
Inhaltsangabe
* Chapter 1: Introduction * Part I: Statutory Interpretation * Chapter 2: Judges as Faithful Agents or Independent, Cooperative Actors? * Chapter 3 * The Basic Core of Statutory Interpretation: Text and Intent * Chapter 4 * The Place of Legislative History, and Purpose v. Specific Meanings * Chapter 5 * What Else Counts, and Should Count, for Statutory Interpretation? * Executive Participation, Subsequent Legislative History, Independent Principles of Decision, Prior Judicial Interpretation, the Passage of Time, and Legislative Direction * Chapter 6 * Administrative Interpretation and the Complications It Reveals * Chapter 7 * Some Central Questions about Common Law Decisions * Chapter 8 * Precedent: Importance and Context * Chapter 9 * Reasoning by Analogy * Chapter 10 * Other Bases for Decision: Principles and Consequential Considerations * Chapter 11 * Comparisons and Conclusions
* Chapter 1: Introduction * Part I: Statutory Interpretation * Chapter 2: Judges as Faithful Agents or Independent, Cooperative Actors? * Chapter 3 * The Basic Core of Statutory Interpretation: Text and Intent * Chapter 4 * The Place of Legislative History, and Purpose v. Specific Meanings * Chapter 5 * What Else Counts, and Should Count, for Statutory Interpretation? * Executive Participation, Subsequent Legislative History, Independent Principles of Decision, Prior Judicial Interpretation, the Passage of Time, and Legislative Direction * Chapter 6 * Administrative Interpretation and the Complications It Reveals * Chapter 7 * Some Central Questions about Common Law Decisions * Chapter 8 * Precedent: Importance and Context * Chapter 9 * Reasoning by Analogy * Chapter 10 * Other Bases for Decision: Principles and Consequential Considerations * Chapter 11 * Comparisons and Conclusions
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