The author defends the ancient claim that justice is at bottom a body of social conventions. Recent analytical and empirical concepts and results from the social sciences together with insights and arguments of past masters of moral and political philosophy are integrated into a new game-theoretic conventionalist analysis of justice.
The author defends the ancient claim that justice is at bottom a body of social conventions. Recent analytical and empirical concepts and results from the social sciences together with insights and arguments of past masters of moral and political philosophy are integrated into a new game-theoretic conventionalist analysis of justice.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Peter P. Vanderschraaf is Professor of Philosophy at the Department of Political Economy and Moral Science at the University of Arizona. He works in social philosophy and game theory. He has held visiting appointments at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Boston University, and the School of Social Sciences of the Institute for Advanced Study.
Inhaltsangabe
Chapter 1. Dilemmas of Interaction Chapter 2. Coordination, Conflict and Convention Chapter 3. The Circumstances of Justice Chapter 4. The Dynamics of Anarchy Chapter 5. Playing Fair Chapter 6. A Limited Leviathan Chapter 7. The Foole, the Shepherd and the Knave Chapter 8. Justice as Mutual Advantage? Appendix 1. Formal Definition of Convention Appendix 2. Computer Simulations of Inductive Learning in Games Appendix 3. Folk Theorems for the Indefinitely Repeated Covenant Game Appendix 4. Humean Conventions of the Repeated Sovereignty and Repeated Provider-Recipient Gamed References Index
Chapter 1. Dilemmas of Interaction Chapter 2. Coordination, Conflict and Convention Chapter 3. The Circumstances of Justice Chapter 4. The Dynamics of Anarchy Chapter 5. Playing Fair Chapter 6. A Limited Leviathan Chapter 7. The Foole, the Shepherd and the Knave Chapter 8. Justice as Mutual Advantage? Appendix 1. Formal Definition of Convention Appendix 2. Computer Simulations of Inductive Learning in Games Appendix 3. Folk Theorems for the Indefinitely Repeated Covenant Game Appendix 4. Humean Conventions of the Repeated Sovereignty and Repeated Provider-Recipient Gamed References Index
Es gelten unsere Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen: www.buecher.de/agb
Impressum
www.buecher.de ist ein Internetauftritt der buecher.de internetstores GmbH
Geschäftsführung: Monica Sawhney | Roland Kölbl | Günter Hilger
Sitz der Gesellschaft: Batheyer Straße 115 - 117, 58099 Hagen
Postanschrift: Bürgermeister-Wegele-Str. 12, 86167 Augsburg
Amtsgericht Hagen HRB 13257
Steuernummer: 321/5800/1497
USt-IdNr: DE450055826