Christopher Carrigan
Structured to Fail?
Christopher Carrigan
Structured to Fail?
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This book employs a diverse set of research methods to confront widely accepted principles of regulatory agency design.
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This book employs a diverse set of research methods to confront widely accepted principles of regulatory agency design.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 338
- Erscheinungstermin: 4. Dezember 2017
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 235mm x 157mm x 23mm
- Gewicht: 643g
- ISBN-13: 9781107181694
- ISBN-10: 1107181690
- Artikelnr.: 48688462
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 338
- Erscheinungstermin: 4. Dezember 2017
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 235mm x 157mm x 23mm
- Gewicht: 643g
- ISBN-13: 9781107181694
- ISBN-10: 1107181690
- Artikelnr.: 48688462
Christopher Carrigan is Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Public Administration at the Trachtenberg School of Public Policy and Administration and a scholar at the Regulatory Studies Center, both at George Washington University, Washington DC. In addition to publications in leading academic journals and edited volumes, Professor Carrigan is co-editor of Does Regulation Kill Jobs? (with Cary Coglianese and Adam M. Finkel, 2014). Professor Carrigan holds a PhD in public policy from Harvard University, Massachusetts and an MBA from the University of Chicago.
1. Linking regulatory failures to organizational design; Part I. Examining
the Performance of Multiple-Purpose Regulators: 2. Isolated effects or
widespread dysfunction?; 3. Appealing to goal ambiguity to explain
performance; Part II. Assessing the Role of Regulatory Agency Design in the
Gulf Oil Disaster: 4. Balancing conflict and coordination at MMS: 5.
Politics and offshore oil and gas policy; Part III. A Theory of
Multiple-Purpose Regulators: 6. Policy context and the political choice to
combine purposes; 7. Operations, organization, politics, and policy
context; Appendix A. Additional description and analyses for chapters 2 and
3; Appendix B. Mathematical context, derivations, and proofs for chapter 6.
the Performance of Multiple-Purpose Regulators: 2. Isolated effects or
widespread dysfunction?; 3. Appealing to goal ambiguity to explain
performance; Part II. Assessing the Role of Regulatory Agency Design in the
Gulf Oil Disaster: 4. Balancing conflict and coordination at MMS: 5.
Politics and offshore oil and gas policy; Part III. A Theory of
Multiple-Purpose Regulators: 6. Policy context and the political choice to
combine purposes; 7. Operations, organization, politics, and policy
context; Appendix A. Additional description and analyses for chapters 2 and
3; Appendix B. Mathematical context, derivations, and proofs for chapter 6.
1. Linking regulatory failures to organizational design; Part I. Examining
the Performance of Multiple-Purpose Regulators: 2. Isolated effects or
widespread dysfunction?; 3. Appealing to goal ambiguity to explain
performance; Part II. Assessing the Role of Regulatory Agency Design in the
Gulf Oil Disaster: 4. Balancing conflict and coordination at MMS: 5.
Politics and offshore oil and gas policy; Part III. A Theory of
Multiple-Purpose Regulators: 6. Policy context and the political choice to
combine purposes; 7. Operations, organization, politics, and policy
context; Appendix A. Additional description and analyses for chapters 2 and
3; Appendix B. Mathematical context, derivations, and proofs for chapter 6.
the Performance of Multiple-Purpose Regulators: 2. Isolated effects or
widespread dysfunction?; 3. Appealing to goal ambiguity to explain
performance; Part II. Assessing the Role of Regulatory Agency Design in the
Gulf Oil Disaster: 4. Balancing conflict and coordination at MMS: 5.
Politics and offshore oil and gas policy; Part III. A Theory of
Multiple-Purpose Regulators: 6. Policy context and the political choice to
combine purposes; 7. Operations, organization, politics, and policy
context; Appendix A. Additional description and analyses for chapters 2 and
3; Appendix B. Mathematical context, derivations, and proofs for chapter 6.