J P Singh

Sweet Talk

Paternalism and Collective Action in North-South Trade Relations

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

J.P. Singh is Chair and Professor of Culture and Political Economy and Director of the Centre for Cultural Relations at the University of Edinburgh. Singh is the author of seven books and Series Editor of Emerging Frontiers in the Global Economy.

---

Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Stanford University Press
• Seitenzahl: 264
• Erscheinungstermin: 11. Januar 2017
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 231mm x 157mm x 20mm
• Gewicht: 499g
• ISBN-13: 9780804794121
• ISBN-10: 080479412X
• Artikelnr.: 45003079

Autorenporträt

J.P. Singh is Chair and Professor of Culture and Political Economy and Director of the Centre for Cultural Relations at the University of Edinburgh. Singh is the author of seven books and Series Editor of Emerging Frontiers in the Global Economy.

Inhaltsangabe

Contents and Abstracts
1Introduction: The Subtext of North-South Relations
chapter abstract
This chapter describes the key linkages for the book: the way paternalistic
strength weakens trade reciprocity and negotiation advantages strengthen it
in North-South trade negotiations. It describes the main counterfactual,
strategic trade theory, and then provides a deeper explanation embedded in
cultural preferences that account better for outcomes in trade
negotiations.
2Who Is Served by Paternalism?
chapter abstract
This chapter first analyzes arguments in favor of, and against, interstate
justice and paternalism-the strong helping the weak-before turning to the
conditions in international negotiations that allow developing countries to
obtain concessions in their favor. Paternalistic concessions are examined
as departures from reciprocity to the extent that they are unilateral
concessions made to the developing world, often in lieu of trade
concessions that the developing world needs. Paternalistic preferences are
traced back to racism. The chapter also explains the developing world's
negotiation advantages.
3GATT and the Developing World before the Uruguay Round
chapter abstract
This chapter shows that postcolonial questions were not paramount in the
creation of GATT. It presents an analysis of trade measures that affected
the developing world from the creation of the GATT to the end of the Tokyo
Round (1979). Three trade measures are examined: the system of imperial
preferences, trade status for infant industry in the developing world, and
the Generalized System of Preferences that resulted in special and
differential treatment for the developing world. The causal variables for
examining the degree of reciprocity in each of these trade measure remain
the same as before: North-South trade negotiations and the degree of
paternalism from the North.
4Unequal Partners in Merchandise Trade
chapter abstract
This chapter attends to the dynamics of paternalism and negotiations at
GATT's Uruguay Round (1986-1994) and the effects on reciprocity in
merchandise trade at the three levels of evidence from mixed methods
presented in this book. First, the chapter attends to the presence of
"sweet talk" as rhetoric. It provides the results of a content analysis of
1,925 pages of press releases for the 1982-1993 period from the U.S. trade
representative for the years of the Uruguay Round, which confirms
paternalism in USTR discourse. Next, the chapter presents the overall
findings on merchandise trade at the Uruguay Round with an index developed
to measure paternalism from a factor analysis of three other indices.
Finally, the textiles agreement from the Uruguay Round is examined as a
case of North-South negotiations in manufacturing.
5An Uneven Playing Field in Agricultural Negotiations
chapter abstract
This chapter analyzes the evidence against North-South trade reciprocity at
all levels discussed in this book: quantitative, historical, and case
studies of sugar and cotton. Former colonies fare worse in agriculture than
they did in manufacturing, even after the Uruguay Round, which ostensibly
opened up some markets in agriculture. The Uruguay and Doha Rounds are
discussed separately. Furthermore, a microanalysis of the causal
factors-paternalism and negotiation advocacy-in the sugar and cotton cases
helps to examine the underlying cultural intransigence that blocks benefits
for the developing world.
6Big Disparities in Services and Intellectual Property
chapter abstract
This chapter explains the difference between the North-South intellectual
property and services agreements. The former is heavily contested, whereas
the latter offers a win-win for North-South negotiations. The North's
coercion and paternalism in intellectual property is explained first. Any
exceptions to TRIPS provisions have resulted from the developing world's
advocacy. The services agreement has enabled many developing
countries-ranging from India as an outsourcing hub to developing country
island states as tourism corridors-"discover" their comparative advantage
in services products. Along the way, the developing world has also been
singled out in policy and media accounts in the United States and the EU
for "stealing" high-tech jobs, and fairly explicit racism has been directed
at countries like India targeting its outsourcing practices.
7Conclusion: The End of Sweet Talk
chapter abstract
This chapter provides a summary of the lessons learned, attends to
counterarguments, and conjectures on ways forward for the developing world.
Contrary to the expectations from a benevolent paternalism, this book finds
scant evidence of sustainable material benefits from paternalism in
international trade relations. Negotiated alternatives, especially
multilateral ones, provide the weak some advantage. Strategic collective
action from the weak fares well, but strategic economic diversification
translates best into negotiation advantages.