Anne Smith, Owen Smith

Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Moral Issues

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

The Taking Sides Collection on McGraw-Hill Create® includes current controversial issues in a debate-style forma designed to stimulate student interest and develop critical thinking skills. This Collection contains a multitude of current and classic issues to enhance and customize your course. You can browse the entire Taking Sides Collection on Create or you can search by topic, author, or keywords. Each Taking Sides issue is thoughtfully framed with Learning Outcomes, an Issue Summary, an Introduction, and an "Exploring the Issue" section featuring Critical Thinking and Reflection, Is There Common Ground?, Additional Resources, and Internet References. Go to the Taking Sides Collection on McGraw-Hill Create® at www.mcgrawhillcreate.com/takingsides and click on "Explore this Collection" to browse the entire Collection. Select individual Taking Sides issues to enhance your course, or access and select the entire Smith: Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Moral Issues, 15/e book here http://create.mheducation.com/createonline/index.html#qlink=search%2Ftext%3Disbn:1259873390 for an easy, pre-built teaching resource. Visit http://create.mheducation.com for more information on other McGraw-Hill titles and special collections.

---

Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: McGraw Hill LLC
• Seitenzahl: 352
• Erscheinungstermin: 27. Februar 2019
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 274mm x 216mm x 15mm
• Gewicht: 726g
• ISBN-13: 9781259873393
• ISBN-10: 1259873390
• Artikelnr.: 54803194

Autorenporträt

ANNE M. SMITH, PhD, RDN, LD is an associate professor emeritus at The Ohio State University. She was the recipient of the Outstanding Teacher Award from the College of Human Ecology, the Outstanding Dietetic Educator Award from the Ohio Dietetic Association, the Outstanding Faculty Member Award from the Department of Human Nutrition, and the Distinguished Service Award from the College of Education and Human Ecology for her commitment to undergraduate education in nutrition. Dr. Smith's research in the area of vitamin and mineral metabolism has appeared in prominent nutrition journals, and she was awarded the Research Award from the Ohio Agricultural Research and Development Center. She is a member of the American Society for Nutrition and the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics.

Inhaltsangabe

Unit 1: Fundamental Issues in Morality
Issue: Is Moral Relativism Correct?
YES: Torbjörn Tännsjö, from "Moral Relativism," Philosophical Studies
(2007)
NO: Louis P. Pojman, from "The Case Against Moral Relativism," in The Moral
Life: An Introductory Reader in Ethics and Literature, Oxford University
Press (2007)
Torbjörn Tännsjö distinguishes among several types of relativism and argues
in favor of one of them, which he calls "ontological relativism." According
to this view, two people may disagree radically on a moral question, and
yet both may be right, because each of them inhabits a different
socially-constructed moral universe. Louis Pojman carefully distinguishes
what he calls the diversity thesis-that moral rules differ from society to
society-from ethical relativism. The diversity thesis is a straightforward
description of what are acknowledged differences in the moral beliefs and
practices of various human groups. But he argues that moral relativism does
not follow from this diversity.
Issue: Does Morality Need Religion?
YES: C. Stephen Layman, from "Ethics and the Kingdom of God," in The Shape
of the Good: Christian Reflections on the Foundations of Ethics, University
of Notre Dame Press (1991)
NO: John Arthur, from "Religion, Morality, and Conscience," in Morality and
Moral Controversies, Prentice Hall (1996)
Philosopher C. Stephen Layman argues that morality makes the most sense
from a theistic perspective and that a purely secular perspective is
insufficient. The secular perspective, Layman asserts, does not adequately
deal with secret violations, and it does not allow for the possibility of
fulfillment of people's deepest needs in an afterlife. Philosopher John
Arthur counters that morality is logically independent of religion,
although there are historical connections. Religion, he believes, is not
necessary for moral guidance or moral answers; morality is social.
Unit 2: Sex, Marriage, and Reproduction
Issue: Is Casual Sex Immoral?
YES: Meg Lovejoy, from "Explaining Why the Practice [Hooking Up] Is More
Costly than Beneficial," in Is Hooking Up Empowering for College Women? A
Feminist Gramscian Perspective, Ph.D. dissertation, Brandeis University
(2012)
NO: Raja Halwani, from "Casual Sex," in Sex from Plato to Paglia: A
Philosophical Encyclopedia, Greenwood Press (2005)
Analyzing interviews with female college students enabled Meg Lovejoy to
state clearly the advantages and disadvantages of sex without commitment
for young women. The disadvantages, including fear of pregnancy and STDs,
reduced self-esteem, and thwarted desire for intimacy, outweigh the
advantages such as immediate pleasure. Raja Halwani first discusses the
difficulties involved in defining casual sex precisely. He next examines a
number of objections to casual sex and concludes that casual sex need not
be morally wrong because each of these objections involves factors that are
not, for the most part, specifically intrinsic to casual sex.
Issue: Is Abortion Immoral?
YES: Mary Meehan, from "Why Liberals Should Defend the Unborn," Human Life
Review (2011)
NO: Amy Borovoy, from "Beyond Choice: A New Framework for Abortion?"
Dissent (2011)
Meehan argues that the unborn are exactly the kind of vulnerable population
traditionally defended by liberals. She discusses a number of factors in
support of this connection, such as scientific claims about when life
begins, the obligations that arise from the act of conception, the
disproportionate impact of abortion on poor women and women of color, and
issues relating to disability rights and the environment. Borovoy argues
that the traditional defense of abortion, which opposes the choice of the
woman against the life of the fetus, does not effectively capture the
unique experience of pregnancy, and finds inspiration for a more satisfying
approach in Japanese culture, where the decision whether or not to have an
abortion is contextualized in the woman's responsibility not only to her
fetus but to her family.
Issue: Is It Morally Right to Prohibit Same-Sex Marriage?
YES: Helen M. Alvaré, from "Brief of Amicus Curiae Helen M. Alvaré in
Support of Hollingsworth and Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group," in
Hollingsworth v. Perry, U.S. v. Windsor, Supreme Court of the United States
(2013)
NO: The American Psychological Associations et al., from "Brief of Amici
Curiae in Support of Affirmance in Hollingsworth v. Perry," Supreme Court
of the United States (2013)
Law professor Helen Alvaré argues that the state's interest in promoting
opposite-sex marriage stems from its interest in the procreation of
children by opposite-sex married couples. Moreover, Alvaré traces the
decline of marriage to the loss of traditional connections among marriage,
sex, and children. State recognition of same-sex marriage would further
undermine these connections and thus contribute to the destabilization of
marriage, with negative repercussions to society, especially among the
poor. Therefore, she argues, the state has an interest in prohibiting
same-sex marriage. The American Psychological Association joins together
with a number of other groups to argue that the substantial benefits that
accrue to married couples should not be denied to same-sex couples. Citing
evidence in favor of the ability of same-sex couples to form stable,
long-lasting committed relationships, they argue that denying marriage to
same-sex couples unfairly stigmatizes and discriminates against them.
Issue: Is it Immoral to Clone Human Beings?
YES: Michael J. Sandel, from "The Ethical Implications of Human Cloning,"
Perspectives in Biology and Medicine (2005)
NO: John A. Robertson, from "Human Cloning and the Challenge of
Regulation," The New England Journal of Medicine (1998)
Political philosopher Michael J. Sandel argues that much of the talk about
cloning revolves around a few limited concepts (e.g., rights, autonomy, and
the supposed unnaturalness of asexual reproduction) that are inadequate and
fail to express what is really wrong with cloning. We need, instead, to
address fundamental questions about our stance toward nature. Law professor
John A. Robertson maintains that there should not be a complete ban on
human cloning but that regulatory policy should be focused on ensuring that
it is performed in a responsible manner.
Unit 3: Law and Society
Issue: Is Paid Organ Donation Morally Permissible?
YES: Michael B. Gill and Robert M. Sade, from "Paying for Kidneys: The Case
Against Prohibition," Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal (2002)
NO: Anya Adair and Stephen J. Wigmore, from "Paid Organ Donation: The Case
Against," Annals of the Royal College of Surgeons of England (2011)
Michael B. Gill and Robert M. Sade argue that since there are no moral
prohibitions against donating kidneys for transplantation or selling blood
plasma, there should be no moral prohibition against selling kidneys for
transplantation. They further argue that selling a kidney does not violate
a person's dignity and that a system in which a person can receive payment
for a kidney is not inherently exploitive. Anya Adair and Stephen J.
Wigmore argue that paid organ donation as currently practiced exploits the
donors. They point to specific exploitive practices, such as withholding
sufficient information for the donors to give truly informed consent.
Further, they argue, any attempt to repair inequities in the system is
doomed to failure because of the inherent inequity; only those under severe
economic constraints will ever be willing to sell their organs.
Issue: Do Anti-Smoking Policies Violate Smokers' Moral Autonomy?
YES: Lewis Maltby, from "Whose Life Is It Anyway? Employer Control of Off
Duty Smoking and Individual Autonomy," William Mitchell Law Review (2008)
NO: Adrien Barton, from "How Tobacco Health Warnings Can Foster Autonomy"
Public Health Ethics (2013)
Lewis Maltby analyzes the growing trend among employers to reduce
health-care costs by regulating their employees' off-duty behavior,
including requiring employees not to smoke. He argues that this trend is
intrusive and unfair, and links it to national anti-smoking policies,
which, he also believes, intrude on people's right to do what they want in
their own homes. Adrien Barton argues that ads that try to persuade people
to stop smoking may seem to act against autonomy by telling them what they
should do. However, since nicotine addiction takes autonomy away, helping
people not to break the addiction helps to restore that autonomy.
Issue: Is Torture Ever Morally Justified?
YES: Mirko Bagaric and Julie Clarke, from "Not Enough Official Torture in
the World? The Circumstances in Which Torture Is Morally Justifiable,"
University of San Francisco Law Review (2005)
NO: Christopher Kutz, from "Torture, Necessity, and Existential Politics,"
California Law Review (2007)
Bagaric and Clarke remind us, first of all, that torture, although pr
ohibited by international law, is nevertheless widely practiced. A rational
examination of torture and a consideration of hypothetical (but realistic)
cases show that torture is justifiable in order to prevent great harm.
Torture should be regulated and carefully practiced as an
information-gathering technique in extreme cases. Christopher Kutz examines
the reasoning intended to justify torture in a memo produced by the Bush
administration and concludes that even in extreme hypothetical cases, such
reasoning is not valid because the right not to be tortured is a
pre-institutional right that cannot be revoked under any circumstances.
Issue: Can a Person Morally Direct Caregivers to Withhold Life-saving
Medical Treatment If He or She Develops Moderate Dementia?
YES: Norman L. Cantor, from "On Avoiding Deep Dementia," Hastings Center
Report (2018)
NO: Daniel P. Sulmasy, from "An Open Letter to Norman Cantor Regarding
Dementia and Physician-Assisted Suicide," Hastings Center Report (2018)
Describing the final stages of dementia as unacceptably degrading, Norman
L. Cantor argues that patients who have received a dementia diagnosis are
justified in planning to allow their lives to end before reaching that
stage. Daniel P. Sulmasy argues that Cantor's assumption that the world
would be better off without him in a deeply demented state is mistaken, and
that legalizing voluntary suicide in such cases would logically lead to
nonvoluntary euthanasia in others.
Issue: Is Physician-Assisted Suicide Morally Permissible?
YES: Kathryn L. Tucker, from "In the Laboratory of the States: The Progress
of Glucksberg's Invitation to States to Address End-of-Life Choice,"
Michigan Law Review (2008)
NO: George J. Annas et al., from "Brief of Amicus Curiae Bioethics
Professors in Vacco v. Quill," Supreme Court of the United States (1997)
Kathryn L. Tucker argues that allowing mentally competent patients who face
a slow and painful death to make it swifter and painless is a beneficial
alternative, and that this practice is morally different from the act of
suicide committed by those who are clinically depressed. George Annas et
al. argue that a "right to suicide" cannot be justified on the same grounds
as the right to refuse treatment, identifying several important differences
between the two. Nor can such a right be justified on the same grounds as a
right to abortion. The authors make it clear that rejecting the claim that
people have a right to commit suicide does not affect the right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment or to have an abortion.
Issue: Is It Morally Permissible for Individuals to Break Quarantine?
YES: Alexander Abdo et al., from "Fear, Politics, and Ebola: How
Quarantines Hurt the Fight Against Ebola and Violate the Constitution,"
ACLU Foundation and Yale Global Health Justice Partnership (2015)
NO: Wendy E. Parmet, from "Quarantine Redux: Bioterrorism, AIDS and the
Curtailment of Individual Liberty in the Name of Public Health," Health
Matrix: Journal of Law-Medicine (2003)
Alexander Abdo et al. assert that the imposition of quarantine during the
Ebola epidemic was unjustified, violated human rights, and even made things
worse by fueling public fears. Wendy E. Parmet acknowledges that there are
times when quarantine is necessary, and that in such cases it is important
to craft laws that balance the need to guard against deadly contagious
diseases and the need to maintain respect for human rights.
Issue: Are Parents Morally Obligated to Vaccinate Their Children?
YES: Charlotte A. Moser, Dorit Reiss and Robert L. Schwartz, from "Funding
the Costs of Disease Outbreaks Caused by Non-Vaccination," Journal of Law,
Medicine & Ethics (2015)
NO: Leonard F. Vernon and Christopher Kent, from "Chiropractors and
Vaccinations: Ethics is the Real Issue," Complementary Health Practice
Review (2009)
Charlotte A. Moser et al. take the position that parents are responsible
for vaccinating their children, and that parents who choose not to do so
must take responsibility for the consequences, not only to their own
children, but to others. Leonard F. Vernon and Christopher Kent claim that
attempts to portray anti-vaccination proponents as unscientific extremists
clouds important issues of informed consent and freedom of choice relating
to health care that they espouse, rather than facing the ethical issues
surrounding fully informed consent.
Unit 4: Humanity, Nature, and Technology
Issue: Does Morality Require Vegetarianism?
YES: Nathan Nobis, from "Vegetarianism and Virtue: Does Consequentialism
Demand Too Little?" Social Theory and Practice (2002)
NO: Beth K. Haile, from "Virtuous Meat Consumption: A Virtue Ethics Defense
of an Omnivorous Way of Life," Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and
Culture (2013)
Nathan Nobis argues that utilitarianism, an ethical theory in which the
moral worth of an action is determined solely by its consequences, requires
us to be vegetarians and avoid the consumption of meat. According to Nobis,
meat and other animal products are produced under cruel conditions, and
utilitarian principles require that we should not participate in or support
activities that are cruel or inflict unnecessary pain on animals. Beth
Haile argues that the consumption of meat can be part of a life that seeks
to cultivate virtue and avoid vice. Although the way in which our society
produces meat for consumption is morally unacceptable, there is nothing
intrinsically wrong about the consumption of meat. Once meat is produced in
a morally acceptable way, a virtuous life can include the consumption of
meat.
Issue: Is It Right to Produce Genetically Modified Food?
YES: Ronald Bailey, from 'Dr. Strangelunch-Or: Why We Should Learn to Stop
Worrying and Love Genetically Modified Food," Reason Magazine (2001)
NO: Michael W. Fox, from "Killer Foods: When Scientists Manipulate Genes,
Better Is Not Always Best," Lyons Press (2004)
Ronald Bailey is a strong supporter of genetically modified food (GMF). He
argues that it is feared by many activists, but there is no strong proof
that there are any problems with it. In fact, he suggests that there are
great benefits that can be provided by GMFs, especially to the world's poor
and to those suffering from natural calamities. Michael Fox is cautious
about the spread of scientism and the morally blind push for technological
development. This scientism, when combined with an aggressive spirit of
enterprise, threatens to upset the balance of nature. We may try to
rearrange natural things (including plants and animals) to serve our own
purposes, but Fox believes that in this way we end up alienating ourselves
from the natural world.
Issue: Is It Morally Necessary for Autonomous Vehicles to be Programmed to
Kill their Drivers?
YES: MIT Technology Review, from "Why Self-Driving Cars Must Be Programmed
to Kill," MIT Technology Review (2015)
NO: Jesse Kirkpatrick, from "The Ethical Quandary of Self-Driving Cars,"
Slate (2016)
MIT Technology Review argues that applying a utilitarian analysis makes it
clear that there will be times when the best outcome of a possible crash
will involve injury or even death to the occupants of the car. Studies show
that people want other people's cars to be programmed in this way, although
they are unwilling to ride in such cars themselves. Jesse Kirkpatrick
argues that crash optimization is a complex and subtle task, and that what
is most important is transparency: drivers need to know in advance how
their car is programmed.
Issue: Is it Moral to Engage in Relations with Sex Robots?
YES: Elizabeth Nolan Brown, from "Sex, Love, and Robots," Reason (2015)
NO: Kathleen Richardson, from "The Asymmetrical 'Relationship': Parallels
Between Prostitution and the Development of Sex Robots," SIGCAS Computers &
Society (2015)
Elizabeth Nolan Brown predicts that people will never lose their preference
for actual human companionship and will enjoy sex with robots primarily as
a harmless diversion. Kathleen Richardson argues that the ability to treat
sex robots as things rather than people, without regard for their feelings
or dignity, will increase and worsen the lack of empathy already felt by
those who treat prostitutes as things rather than people.
Issue: Is it Ethical to Employ Service Animals?
YES: Nora Wenthold and Teresa A. Savage, from "Ethical Issues with Service
Animals," Topics in Stroke Rehabilitation (2007)
NO: Randy Malamud, from "Service Animals: Serve Us Animals: Serve Us,
Animals," Social Alternatives (2013)
Nora Wenthold and Teresa A, Savage consider the overall use of service
animals to be justified. They describe, however, a number of situations in
which ethical treatment of service animals requires careful consideration
of the animal's strengths, limitations, and well-being. Understanding and
respecting the animal's nature is a crucial and sometimes overlooked
ethical requirement. Randy Malamud argues that our current attitudes tow
ard service animals spring from speciesism, an attitude that members of
certain species (such as humans) have greater value or more rights than
certain other species (such as nonhumans). He is especially concerned about
the extension of the practice to animals such as monkeys, parrots, and
dolphins, which may derive little benefit to themselves from their
association with humans.