This book answers the important question - how does China maintain authoritarian rule while it is committed to market-oriented economic reforms?Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Hiroki Takeuchi is Associate Professor of Political Science and Fellow of the John Goodwin Tower Center for Political Studies at Southern Methodist University. He previously taught at the University of California, Los Angeles, as faculty Fellow in the political science department and at Stanford University as postdoctoral teaching Fellow in the public policy program. He received his PhD in political science from UCLA, specializing in comparative politics and international relations. His research focuses on Chinese and Japanese politics, comparative political economy of authoritarian regimes, and political economy and international relations in East Asia, as well as game theory applications to political science. His recent articles have been published in the Journal of Contemporary China, the Journal of Chinese Political Science, the Japanese Journal of Political Science, the Journal of East Asian Studies, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, and Modern China.
Inhaltsangabe
Introduction 1. The theory of revenue and resistance under authoritarian rule in rural China Part I. Historical and Analytical Contexts: 2. Revenue and resistance in rural China in history 3. Revenue and resistance under authoritarian rule in post-Mao rural China, 1980-2005 4. Survival strategies of local governments: from predatory taxation to land trade Part II. Analytic Narratives: 5. Exit strategies of villagers: migration and taxation in rural China Appendix 5A: formal description and solution to the game of migration and taxation 6. Voice strategies of villagers: petitions and taxation in rural China Appendix 6A: formal description and solution to the game of migration, participation, and taxation 7. Village elections and authoritarian rule in rural China Appendix 7A: formal description and solution to the village election game Conclusion Appendix of empirical sources and methods: Appendix A: list of informants Appendix B: interview questions Appendix C: sources of the cases on village elections.
Introduction 1. The theory of revenue and resistance under authoritarian rule in rural China Part I. Historical and Analytical Contexts: 2. Revenue and resistance in rural China in history 3. Revenue and resistance under authoritarian rule in post-Mao rural China, 1980-2005 4. Survival strategies of local governments: from predatory taxation to land trade Part II. Analytic Narratives: 5. Exit strategies of villagers: migration and taxation in rural China Appendix 5A: formal description and solution to the game of migration and taxation 6. Voice strategies of villagers: petitions and taxation in rural China Appendix 6A: formal description and solution to the game of migration, participation, and taxation 7. Village elections and authoritarian rule in rural China Appendix 7A: formal description and solution to the village election game Conclusion Appendix of empirical sources and methods: Appendix A: list of informants Appendix B: interview questions Appendix C: sources of the cases on village elections.
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