What is it like 'on the inside' for nonhuman animals? Do they feel anything? Most people happily accept that dogs, for example, share many experiences and feelings with us. But what about simpler creatures? Fish? Honeybees? Crabs? Turning to the artificial realm, what about robots? This book presents answers to these questions.
What is it like 'on the inside' for nonhuman animals? Do they feel anything? Most people happily accept that dogs, for example, share many experiences and feelings with us. But what about simpler creatures? Fish? Honeybees? Crabs? Turning to the artificial realm, what about robots? This book presents answers to these questions.
Michael Tye encountered philosophy at Oxford and taught at Temple University, St. Andrews, and the University of London before coming to the University of Texas at Austin in 2003, where he is the Dallas TACA Centennial Professor in Liberal Arts.
Inhaltsangabe
Chapter 1: Experience and Its Limits: The Problem. Chapter 2 -- Experience and Consciousness 2.1 Problem Cases? 2.2 The Higher Order Theory of Consciousness 2.3 Phenomenal consciousness versus access consciousness 2.4 Phenomenal consciousness versus access consciousness 2.5 The upshot for animal consciousness Chapter 3: It's Got to be Human! 3.1 Descartes and the animals 3.2 Descartes and Turing 3.3 Conceptualism about experience Chapter 4 - Our Friends and Neighbors 4.1 Beliefs and desires 4.2 Experiences and feelings Chapter 5: Reasoning about Other Species 5.1 Cupcake's pain 5.2 Sharpening the issue 5.3 Is the absence of a neocortex a defeater? 5.4 Should we be agnostic? 5.5 Alternative strategies Chapter 6: A Fish Called Wanda 6.1 Pain 6.2 Fish nociception and fish behavior 6.3 Is there a better explanation? 6.4 Fish fear 6.5 Perceptual consciousness in fish 6.6 Yes, but are there really fish qualia? Chapter 7: Of Birds and Reptiles (and Fish) 7.1 The origins of birds 7.2 Bird emotions 7.3 Birds and pain 7.4 Perceptual experiences in birds 7.5 Reptiles Chapter 8: Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs 8.1 Insect nociception and pain 8.2 Insects and emotions 8.3 Are bees zombies? 8.4 Crabs and pain 8.5 Crabs and bees Chapter 9: The Girl Who Cannot Feel Pain 9.1 A complaint from Block 9.2 Protozoa 9.3 Plants 9.4 Caterpillars Chapter 10: Commander Data and Robot Rabbit 10.1 The original China-Body problem 10.2 Reasoning about Commander Data 10.3 The silicon chip argument 10.4 Real rabbit and robot rabbit 10.5 A further reason for preferring the view that Commander Data and robot rabbit are conscious 10.6 A final consideration Chapter 11: The Ethical Treatment of Animals 11.1 Animal welfarism 11.2 Speciesism 11.3 Regan and Rawls 11.4 Centered speciesism and biological proximity 11.5 The treatment of animals
Chapter 1: Experience and Its Limits: The Problem. Chapter 2 -- Experience and Consciousness 2.1 Problem Cases? 2.2 The Higher Order Theory of Consciousness 2.3 Phenomenal consciousness versus access consciousness 2.4 Phenomenal consciousness versus access consciousness 2.5 The upshot for animal consciousness Chapter 3: It's Got to be Human! 3.1 Descartes and the animals 3.2 Descartes and Turing 3.3 Conceptualism about experience Chapter 4 - Our Friends and Neighbors 4.1 Beliefs and desires 4.2 Experiences and feelings Chapter 5: Reasoning about Other Species 5.1 Cupcake's pain 5.2 Sharpening the issue 5.3 Is the absence of a neocortex a defeater? 5.4 Should we be agnostic? 5.5 Alternative strategies Chapter 6: A Fish Called Wanda 6.1 Pain 6.2 Fish nociception and fish behavior 6.3 Is there a better explanation? 6.4 Fish fear 6.5 Perceptual consciousness in fish 6.6 Yes, but are there really fish qualia? Chapter 7: Of Birds and Reptiles (and Fish) 7.1 The origins of birds 7.2 Bird emotions 7.3 Birds and pain 7.4 Perceptual experiences in birds 7.5 Reptiles Chapter 8: Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs 8.1 Insect nociception and pain 8.2 Insects and emotions 8.3 Are bees zombies? 8.4 Crabs and pain 8.5 Crabs and bees Chapter 9: The Girl Who Cannot Feel Pain 9.1 A complaint from Block 9.2 Protozoa 9.3 Plants 9.4 Caterpillars Chapter 10: Commander Data and Robot Rabbit 10.1 The original China-Body problem 10.2 Reasoning about Commander Data 10.3 The silicon chip argument 10.4 Real rabbit and robot rabbit 10.5 A further reason for preferring the view that Commander Data and robot rabbit are conscious 10.6 A final consideration Chapter 11: The Ethical Treatment of Animals 11.1 Animal welfarism 11.2 Speciesism 11.3 Regan and Rawls 11.4 Centered speciesism and biological proximity 11.5 The treatment of animals
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