The 2007 Iran Nuclear Estimate Revisited
Anatomy of a Controversy
Herausgeber: Jervis, Robert; Wirtz, James J
The 2007 Iran Nuclear Estimate Revisited
Anatomy of a Controversy
Herausgeber: Jervis, Robert; Wirtz, James J
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This book explores both the contents and reaction to the U.S. intelligence community's National Intelligence Estimate that Iran had suspended its clandestine program to develop nuclear weapons.
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This book explores both the contents and reaction to the U.S. intelligence community's National Intelligence Estimate that Iran had suspended its clandestine program to develop nuclear weapons.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Taylor & Francis Ltd (Sales)
- Seitenzahl: 184
- Erscheinungstermin: 29. Januar 2024
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 246mm x 175mm x 9mm
- Gewicht: 449g
- ISBN-13: 9781032169651
- ISBN-10: 1032169656
- Artikelnr.: 69929266
- Verlag: Taylor & Francis Ltd (Sales)
- Seitenzahl: 184
- Erscheinungstermin: 29. Januar 2024
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 246mm x 175mm x 9mm
- Gewicht: 449g
- ISBN-13: 9781032169651
- ISBN-10: 1032169656
- Artikelnr.: 69929266
Robert Jervis is Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics at Columbia University, USA. He is the author of many books, including Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (2010). He received his Ph.D. from University of California, Berkeley, USA. James J. Wirtz is Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, USA. He recently completed co-editing the 7th edition of Strategy in the Contemporary World (2022). He received his Ph.D. from Columbia University, USA.
Preface Introduction: How could getting it right go so wrong? The 2007 Iran
NIE revisited PART I 1. National Intelligence Estimate. Iran: nuclear
intentions and capabilities - Key judgments 2. CIA support to policymakers:
the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear intentions and
capabilities 3. Reevaluating the 'externals' and 'internals' of the 2007
Iran nuclear NIE PART II 4. Reflections on the 2007 Iran NIE controversy 5.
2007 Iran nuclear NIE: more of the story 6. Tradecraft, the PIAB, and the
2007 NIE on Iran's Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities 7. The November 2007
Iran nuclear NIE: immediate aftermath PART III 8. Reflections on conveying
uncertainty 9. The Iran nuclear archive: impressions and implications PART
IV 10. Shifting currents: changes in National Intelligence Estimates on the
Iran nuclear threat 11. U.S.-Iran confrontation in the post-NIE world: an
analysis of alternative policy options 12. Weapons of mass destruction: the
issue of 'actionable' intelligence Epilogue: The rise of
counter-proliferation intelligence
NIE revisited PART I 1. National Intelligence Estimate. Iran: nuclear
intentions and capabilities - Key judgments 2. CIA support to policymakers:
the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear intentions and
capabilities 3. Reevaluating the 'externals' and 'internals' of the 2007
Iran nuclear NIE PART II 4. Reflections on the 2007 Iran NIE controversy 5.
2007 Iran nuclear NIE: more of the story 6. Tradecraft, the PIAB, and the
2007 NIE on Iran's Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities 7. The November 2007
Iran nuclear NIE: immediate aftermath PART III 8. Reflections on conveying
uncertainty 9. The Iran nuclear archive: impressions and implications PART
IV 10. Shifting currents: changes in National Intelligence Estimates on the
Iran nuclear threat 11. U.S.-Iran confrontation in the post-NIE world: an
analysis of alternative policy options 12. Weapons of mass destruction: the
issue of 'actionable' intelligence Epilogue: The rise of
counter-proliferation intelligence
Preface Introduction: How could getting it right go so wrong? The 2007 Iran
NIE revisited PART I 1. National Intelligence Estimate. Iran: nuclear
intentions and capabilities - Key judgments 2. CIA support to policymakers:
the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear intentions and
capabilities 3. Reevaluating the 'externals' and 'internals' of the 2007
Iran nuclear NIE PART II 4. Reflections on the 2007 Iran NIE controversy 5.
2007 Iran nuclear NIE: more of the story 6. Tradecraft, the PIAB, and the
2007 NIE on Iran's Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities 7. The November 2007
Iran nuclear NIE: immediate aftermath PART III 8. Reflections on conveying
uncertainty 9. The Iran nuclear archive: impressions and implications PART
IV 10. Shifting currents: changes in National Intelligence Estimates on the
Iran nuclear threat 11. U.S.-Iran confrontation in the post-NIE world: an
analysis of alternative policy options 12. Weapons of mass destruction: the
issue of 'actionable' intelligence Epilogue: The rise of
counter-proliferation intelligence
NIE revisited PART I 1. National Intelligence Estimate. Iran: nuclear
intentions and capabilities - Key judgments 2. CIA support to policymakers:
the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear intentions and
capabilities 3. Reevaluating the 'externals' and 'internals' of the 2007
Iran nuclear NIE PART II 4. Reflections on the 2007 Iran NIE controversy 5.
2007 Iran nuclear NIE: more of the story 6. Tradecraft, the PIAB, and the
2007 NIE on Iran's Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities 7. The November 2007
Iran nuclear NIE: immediate aftermath PART III 8. Reflections on conveying
uncertainty 9. The Iran nuclear archive: impressions and implications PART
IV 10. Shifting currents: changes in National Intelligence Estimates on the
Iran nuclear threat 11. U.S.-Iran confrontation in the post-NIE world: an
analysis of alternative policy options 12. Weapons of mass destruction: the
issue of 'actionable' intelligence Epilogue: The rise of
counter-proliferation intelligence