Sushil Bikhchandani, Jack Hirshleifer, John G. Riley

The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information, Second Edition

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

There has been explosive progress in the economic theory of uncertainty and information in the past few decades. This subject is now taught not only in departments of economics but also in professional schools and programs oriented toward business, government and administration, and public policy. This book attempts to unify the subject matter in a simple, accessible manner. Part I of the book focuses on the economics of uncertainty; Part II examines the economics of information. This revised and updated second edition places a greater focus on game theory. New topics include posted-price markets, mechanism design, common-value auctions, and the one-shot deviation principle for repeated games.

---

Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.

Produktdetails

• Cambridge Surveys of Economic Literature
• Verlag: Cambridge University Press
• 2., überarb. Aufl.
• Seitenzahl: 508
• Erscheinungstermin: 20. März 2017
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 27mm
• Gewicht: 694g
• ISBN-13: 9780521541961
• ISBN-10: 0521541964
• Artikelnr.: 38611795

Autorenporträt

Sushil Bikhchandani is a Professor in the Anderson School of Management Economics at the University of California, Los Angeles. His teaching and research interests include auctions, market institutions, herd behavior and information economics. Professor Bikhchandani has published in numerous academic journals, including Theoretical Economics, Operations Research, the Journal of Economic Theory, and Econometrica.

Inhaltsangabe

Part I: 1. Elements of decision under uncertainty; 2. Risk-bearing: the optimum of the individual; 3. Comparative statics of the risk-bearing optimum; 4. Market equilibrium under uncertainty; Part II: 5. Information and informational decisions; 6. Information and markets; 7. Strategic uncertainty and equilibrium concepts; 8. Informational asymmetry and contract design; 9. Competition and hidden knowledge; 10. Market institutions; 11. Long-run relationships and the credibility of threats and promises; 12. Information aggregation, transmission, and acquisition.

Rezensionen

'This is a beautifully clear book on the economics of uncertainty and information. The second edition contains a good deal of valuable new material, such as on the production, transmission, acquisition, and aggregation of information.' Eric Maskin, Harvard University, and Nobel Laureate in Economics