This second edition, with a greater focus on game theory, attempts to unify recent developments in economic theories of uncertainty and information for students.
This second edition, with a greater focus on game theory, attempts to unify recent developments in economic theories of uncertainty and information for students.
Sushil Bikhchandani is a Professor in the Anderson School of Management Economics at the University of California, Los Angeles. His teaching and research interests include auctions, market institutions, herd behavior and information economics. Professor Bikhchandani has published in numerous academic journals, including Theoretical Economics, Operations Research, the Journal of Economic Theory, and Econometrica.
Inhaltsangabe
Part I: 1. Elements of decision under uncertainty 2. Risk-bearing: the optimum of the individual 3. Comparative statics of the risk-bearing optimum 4. Market equilibrium under uncertainty Part II: 5. Information and informational decisions 6. Information and markets 7. Strategic uncertainty and equilibrium concepts 8. Informational asymmetry and contract design 9. Competition and hidden knowledge 10. Market institutions 11. Long-run relationships and the credibility of threats and promises 12. Information aggregation, transmission, and acquisition.
Part I: 1. Elements of decision under uncertainty 2. Risk-bearing: the optimum of the individual 3. Comparative statics of the risk-bearing optimum 4. Market equilibrium under uncertainty Part II: 5. Information and informational decisions 6. Information and markets 7. Strategic uncertainty and equilibrium concepts 8. Informational asymmetry and contract design 9. Competition and hidden knowledge 10. Market institutions 11. Long-run relationships and the credibility of threats and promises 12. Information aggregation, transmission, and acquisition.
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