Andere Kunden interessierten sich auch für
![Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles: Airpower by the People, for the People, But Not with the People]( "Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles: Airpower by the People, for the People, But Not with the People")
Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles: Airpower by the People, for the People, But Not with the People60,99 €![Turning the Vertical Flank: Airpower as a Maneuver Force in the Theater Campaign]( "Turning the Vertical Flank: Airpower as a Maneuver Force in the Theater Campaign")
Turning the Vertical Flank: Airpower as a Maneuver Force in the Theater Campaign63,99 €![Paradigm Lost: Rethinking Theater Airlift to Support the Army After Next]( "Paradigm Lost: Rethinking Theater Airlift to Support the Army After Next")
Paradigm Lost: Rethinking Theater Airlift to Support the Army After Next61,99 €![The Anzus Rift: The Politics of the Matter]( "The Anzus Rift: The Politics of the Matter")
The Anzus Rift: The Politics of the Matter63,99 €![Beyond the Battle Line: US Air Attack Theory and Doctrine, 1919-1941]( "Beyond the Battle Line: US Air Attack Theory and Doctrine, 1919-1941")
Beyond the Battle Line: US Air Attack Theory and Doctrine, 1919-194161,99 €![Airpower and the Cult of the Offensive]( "Airpower and the Cult of the Offensive")
Airpower and the Cult of the Offensive60,99 €![Air Mobility: The Key to the United States National Security Strategy]( "Air Mobility: The Key to the United States National Security Strategy")
Air Mobility: The Key to the United States National Security Strategy63,99 €
This study addresses the role that the air force wing commander plays in affecting the level of aircrew morale during air combat. This study answers the question: Is it possible to identify those characteristics of leadership that are able to sustain aircrew morale in the face of significant losses? First, the author defines aircrew morale as the enthusiasm and persistence of airmen to fly combat missions. Next, the author establishes a framework within which aircrew morale can be assessed in three historical case studies of air combat. The first case study is Adolf Galland and Jagdgeschwader 26 during the Battle of Britain. The second case study is Joseph Laughlin and the 362d Fighter Group during the invasion of France in the summer of 1944. The final case study is James McCarthy and the 43rd Strategic Wing during Operation LINEBACKER II. The author concludes that aircrew control over development of combat tactics was the most important element affecting morale. Morale was generally raised in each case study when the wing commander either displayed tactical innovation himself, or allowed his pilots or crews to become innovative. The author recommends that the USAF take steps to modify doctrine and professional military education curriculum to relate these findings to the combat air forces.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.