Presents a sustained and original challenge to the orthodox understanding of the relationship between morality and voluntary choice. The two main theses of the book are that we can be morally responsible for aspects of our character that we have not chosen or otherwise authored, and that we can enter into interpersonal commitments to which we have not voluntarily consented.
Presents a sustained and original challenge to the orthodox understanding of the relationship between morality and voluntary choice. The two main theses of the book are that we can be morally responsible for aspects of our character that we have not chosen or otherwise authored, and that we can enter into interpersonal commitments to which we have not voluntarily consented.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Talbot Brewer is in the philosophy department at the University of Virginia.
Inhaltsangabe
Preface Acknowledgments A Difficulty with Kant's Account of Desire Introduction I. Kant on Moral Worth an dGoodness of Will II. Difficulties with Kant's Notion of Moral Worth III. Moral Worth and Virtue IV. Specifying Our Reservatio about Kant's Cases V. Recasting the Groundwork Cases VI. Kant's Second Critique Thought Experiment VII. Conclusion Kantian Virtue, Affects and Rules Introduction I. Kantian Virtue and Joyfulness in Dutiful Action II. Emprical and Intelligible Virtue III. Affects and Perceptual Salience IV. The Value of Moral Sensibility V. The Place of Rules in Moral Sensibility VI. Two Kinds of Illusions VII. Desires as Consequences of Past Choices VIII. Kant's Reductio of Voluntarist Accounts of Responsibility? Two Conceptions of Commitment Introduction: Undertaking commitments I. The Words that Commit Us II. The Peculiar Case of Consent III. Commissive Force and Descriptive Truth IV. Commitments and Social Groups V. Two Kinds of Social Groups VI. INternalist Commitment, Integrity and Authority Special Non-PRomissory Obligations Introduction I. Walzer on Obligations and Commitments II. Internalist and Externalist Commitments III. Walzer and INternalist Commitments IV. The Conditions of Ultimate Obligation V. An Analysis of Special Non-Promissory Obligations VI. The Radicalism of Internalist Obligations--Ibsen's Nora Bibliography Index
Preface Acknowledgments A Difficulty with Kant's Account of Desire Introduction I. Kant on Moral Worth an dGoodness of Will II. Difficulties with Kant's Notion of Moral Worth III. Moral Worth and Virtue IV. Specifying Our Reservatio about Kant's Cases V. Recasting the Groundwork Cases VI. Kant's Second Critique Thought Experiment VII. Conclusion Kantian Virtue, Affects and Rules Introduction I. Kantian Virtue and Joyfulness in Dutiful Action II. Emprical and Intelligible Virtue III. Affects and Perceptual Salience IV. The Value of Moral Sensibility V. The Place of Rules in Moral Sensibility VI. Two Kinds of Illusions VII. Desires as Consequences of Past Choices VIII. Kant's Reductio of Voluntarist Accounts of Responsibility? Two Conceptions of Commitment Introduction: Undertaking commitments I. The Words that Commit Us II. The Peculiar Case of Consent III. Commissive Force and Descriptive Truth IV. Commitments and Social Groups V. Two Kinds of Social Groups VI. INternalist Commitment, Integrity and Authority Special Non-PRomissory Obligations Introduction I. Walzer on Obligations and Commitments II. Internalist and Externalist Commitments III. Walzer and INternalist Commitments IV. The Conditions of Ultimate Obligation V. An Analysis of Special Non-Promissory Obligations VI. The Radicalism of Internalist Obligations--Ibsen's Nora Bibliography Index
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