Neil S. Siegel (David W. Ichel Professor of Law and Professor of Po

The Collective-Action Constitution

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

The Collective-Action Constitution discusses how the U.S. Constitution is based on the principles of collective action among states, and how this understanding can provide guidance on addressing the sobering problems facing America today.

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Produktdetails

• Theoretical Perspectives in Law
• Verlag: Oxford University Press Inc
• Seitenzahl: 520
• Erscheinungstermin: 26. April 2024
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 226mm x 152mm x 38mm
• Gewicht: 856g
• ISBN-13: 9780197760963
• ISBN-10: 0197760961
• Artikelnr.: 69310428

Autorenporträt

Neil S. Siegel is the David W. Ichel Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science at Duke Law School, where he also serves as Associate Dean for Intellectual Life and Director of the Summer Institute on Law and Policy. He has been writing, teaching, speaking, debating, and testifying about the U.S. Constitution, constitutional law, and the federal courts since 2004. A former law clerk to Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, he has worked in the United States Senate on the nominations of six current Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.

Inhaltsangabe

* Introduction
* Part I: Thinking Constitutionally, and Collectively
* 1. Foundations: McCulloch
* 2. The New "Science of Politics"
* Part II: A Collective-Action Theory of the Federal Structure-and Its
Limits
* 3. The Roles of the States and the Interstate Compacts Clause
* 4. The Necessity of Federal Power: Taxing, Spending, and Borrowing
* 5. Interstate Commerce, Foreign Commerce, and Related Principles
* 6. National Security, Positive Externalities, and National Uniformity
* 7. Executive Energy, Judicial Authority, and Federal Supremacy
* 8. Races to the Bottom, Interstate Coordination, and Territorial
Empire
* 9. Constitutional Rights, Collective Action, and Individual Action
* Part III: Perfecting the Collective-Action Constitution
* 10. The Collective Costs of Strict Supermajority Requirements
* 11. The Problem of Congressional Gridlock
* Conclusion
* Postscript on Methodology
* Index of Constitutional Provisions
* Index of Cases
* General Index