Emmanuel Lazega

The Collegial Phenomenon

The Social Mechanisms of Cooperation Among Peers in a Corporate Law Partnership

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

These mechanisms and the solutions they provide are examined using a broadly-conceived structural approach combining theory-driven network analysis, ethnography of task forces performing knowledge-intensive work, and analysis of management and internal politics in the firm. Emmanuel Lazega presents a theory of the collegial organization which generalizes its results to all kinds of partnerships, larger multinational professional services firms, and collegial pockets in flattening bureaucracies alike.

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This book provides a grounded theory of the collegial form of organization. It is based on a network analysis of a traditional and successful Northeastern US corporate law firm in which partners -- rational and calculating actors if there ever were any -- locked themselves in a cooperative and long-term situation without much hierarchy and formal power differences to enforce their agreements.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Hurst & Co.
• Seitenzahl: 358
• Erscheinungstermin: 8. November 2001
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 242mm x 164mm x 27mm
• Gewicht: 640g
• ISBN-13: 9780199242726
• ISBN-10: 0199242720
• Artikelnr.: 21750188

Autorenporträt

Emmanuel Lazega is Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Lille I, France. Previous positions have included Assistant Professor at the University of Versailles (1993-1999); Postdoctoral Fellow at Yale University (1988-1991); and Researcher at the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, Wolfson College, Oxford University (1986-1988)

Inhaltsangabe

Introduction
1.: A Structural Theory of Collective Action Among Peers
2.: Spencer, Grace, and Robbins
3.: Niches and Status in the Firm: A Specific Exchange System
4.: Economic Performance and Quality Control
5.: Too Many Chefs?
6.: Balance of Power and Organizational Integration: A Montesquieu Structure
7.: Pressuring Partners Back to Good Order: A Lateral Control Regime
8.: Multi-Status Oligarchs and the Negotiation of Precarious Values
Conclusion