Fabrizio Barca / Marco Becht (eds.)
The Control of Corporate Europe
Herausgeber: Barca, Fabrizio; Becht, Marco
Fabrizio Barca / Marco Becht (eds.)
The Control of Corporate Europe
Herausgeber: Barca, Fabrizio; Becht, Marco
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This volume describes how listed companies are controlled in nine different European countries, and includes a chapter on the USA, allowing transatlantic comparison. Each country study provides an analysis of standardized measures of the size and distribution of voting power, and then explores the aspects of corporate control that are most prominent in the country concerned.
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This volume describes how listed companies are controlled in nine different European countries, and includes a chapter on the USA, allowing transatlantic comparison. Each country study provides an analysis of standardized measures of the size and distribution of voting power, and then explores the aspects of corporate control that are most prominent in the country concerned.
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Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Oxford University Press, USA
- Seitenzahl: 354
- Erscheinungstermin: 17. Januar 2002
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 230mm x 175mm x 24mm
- Gewicht: 644g
- ISBN-13: 9780199247424
- ISBN-10: 0199247420
- Artikelnr.: 21954204
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- gpsr@libri.de
- Verlag: Oxford University Press, USA
- Seitenzahl: 354
- Erscheinungstermin: 17. Januar 2002
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 230mm x 175mm x 24mm
- Gewicht: 644g
- ISBN-13: 9780199247424
- ISBN-10: 0199247420
- Artikelnr.: 21954204
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- gpsr@libri.de
Fabrizio Barca is General Director for Development at the Italian Treasury, President of the OECD Territorial Policies Committee, and Director of a Research Programme on Corporate and Public Administration Governance at Siena University. He has previously been at the Bank of Italy as Division Chief at the Research Department and Chief of the Department of Development Policies at the Italian Treasury. He graduated from Rome University and completed an M.Phil. degree and research activity at the Universities of Cambridge (1978-80), MIT (1989-90), and Stanford (1994). He had appointments at the Universities of Bocconi, Siena, Modena, and Rome, where he taught corporate finance and Italian economic history. His works include papers and books on the theory of the firm, evidence on SMes, corporate governance and the history of Italian capitalism. Marco Becht teaches at the Institute for European Studies, the Solvay Business School, and the Law Faculty of the Université Libre de Bruxelles. He graduated from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and holds a Ph.D. in economics from the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence. Becht's research focuses on corporate governance and empirical corporate finance. He is a Resident Fellow at ECARES and a Research Associate of CEPR. He was previously at the Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros (CEMFI) in Madrid and the European Commission's Directorate for Industry (DG III). Becht is the executive coordinator of the European Corporate Governance Network (ECGN) and the scientific advisor of the Corporate Governance Committee of the European Association of Securities Dealers (EASD).
* 1: M. Becht and C. Mayer: The Control of Corporate Europe
* 2: K. Gugler, S. Kalss, A. Stomper, and J. Zechner: The Separation of
Ownership and Control in Austria
* 3: M. Becht, A. Chapelle, and L. Renneboog: Shareholding Cascades:
The Separation of Ownership and Control in Belgium
* 4: L. Bloch and E. Kremp: Ownership and Voting Power in France
* 5: M. Becht and E. Boehmer: Ownership and Voting Power in Germany
* 6: M. Bianchi, M. Bianco, and L. Enriques: Pyramidal Groups and the
Separation between Ownership and Control in Italy
* 7: A. de Jong, R. Kabir, T. Marra, and A. Roell: Ownership and
Control in the Netherlands
* 8: R. Crespi and M. Garcia-Cestona: Ownership and Control of Spanish
Listed Firms
* 9: J. Agnblad, E. Berglof, P. Hogfeldt, and H. Svancar: Ownership and
Control in Sweden---Strong Owners, Weak Minorities, and Social
Control
* 10: M. Goergen and L. Renneboog: Strong Managers and Passive
Institutional Investors in the United Kingdom
* 11: M. Becht: Beneficial Ownership in the United States
* Appendix I
* Appendix II
* 2: K. Gugler, S. Kalss, A. Stomper, and J. Zechner: The Separation of
Ownership and Control in Austria
* 3: M. Becht, A. Chapelle, and L. Renneboog: Shareholding Cascades:
The Separation of Ownership and Control in Belgium
* 4: L. Bloch and E. Kremp: Ownership and Voting Power in France
* 5: M. Becht and E. Boehmer: Ownership and Voting Power in Germany
* 6: M. Bianchi, M. Bianco, and L. Enriques: Pyramidal Groups and the
Separation between Ownership and Control in Italy
* 7: A. de Jong, R. Kabir, T. Marra, and A. Roell: Ownership and
Control in the Netherlands
* 8: R. Crespi and M. Garcia-Cestona: Ownership and Control of Spanish
Listed Firms
* 9: J. Agnblad, E. Berglof, P. Hogfeldt, and H. Svancar: Ownership and
Control in Sweden---Strong Owners, Weak Minorities, and Social
Control
* 10: M. Goergen and L. Renneboog: Strong Managers and Passive
Institutional Investors in the United Kingdom
* 11: M. Becht: Beneficial Ownership in the United States
* Appendix I
* Appendix II
* 1: M. Becht and C. Mayer: The Control of Corporate Europe
* 2: K. Gugler, S. Kalss, A. Stomper, and J. Zechner: The Separation of
Ownership and Control in Austria
* 3: M. Becht, A. Chapelle, and L. Renneboog: Shareholding Cascades:
The Separation of Ownership and Control in Belgium
* 4: L. Bloch and E. Kremp: Ownership and Voting Power in France
* 5: M. Becht and E. Boehmer: Ownership and Voting Power in Germany
* 6: M. Bianchi, M. Bianco, and L. Enriques: Pyramidal Groups and the
Separation between Ownership and Control in Italy
* 7: A. de Jong, R. Kabir, T. Marra, and A. Roell: Ownership and
Control in the Netherlands
* 8: R. Crespi and M. Garcia-Cestona: Ownership and Control of Spanish
Listed Firms
* 9: J. Agnblad, E. Berglof, P. Hogfeldt, and H. Svancar: Ownership and
Control in Sweden---Strong Owners, Weak Minorities, and Social
Control
* 10: M. Goergen and L. Renneboog: Strong Managers and Passive
Institutional Investors in the United Kingdom
* 11: M. Becht: Beneficial Ownership in the United States
* Appendix I
* Appendix II
* 2: K. Gugler, S. Kalss, A. Stomper, and J. Zechner: The Separation of
Ownership and Control in Austria
* 3: M. Becht, A. Chapelle, and L. Renneboog: Shareholding Cascades:
The Separation of Ownership and Control in Belgium
* 4: L. Bloch and E. Kremp: Ownership and Voting Power in France
* 5: M. Becht and E. Boehmer: Ownership and Voting Power in Germany
* 6: M. Bianchi, M. Bianco, and L. Enriques: Pyramidal Groups and the
Separation between Ownership and Control in Italy
* 7: A. de Jong, R. Kabir, T. Marra, and A. Roell: Ownership and
Control in the Netherlands
* 8: R. Crespi and M. Garcia-Cestona: Ownership and Control of Spanish
Listed Firms
* 9: J. Agnblad, E. Berglof, P. Hogfeldt, and H. Svancar: Ownership and
Control in Sweden---Strong Owners, Weak Minorities, and Social
Control
* 10: M. Goergen and L. Renneboog: Strong Managers and Passive
Institutional Investors in the United Kingdom
* 11: M. Becht: Beneficial Ownership in the United States
* Appendix I
* Appendix II