Andere Kunden interessierten sich auch für
![Terrorism, Deterrence, and Nuclear Weapons: Is the Current Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Effective?]( "Terrorism, Deterrence, and Nuclear Weapons: Is the Current Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Effective?")
Terrorism, Deterrence, and Nuclear Weapons: Is the Current Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Effective?60,99 €![Pakistan and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation: A Historical Analysis of the Pakistani Nuclear Program 1947-1990]( "Pakistan and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation: A Historical Analysis of the Pakistani Nuclear Program 1947-1990")
Pakistan and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation: A Historical Analysis of the Pakistani Nuclear Program 1947-199061,99 €![Nanotechnology Weapons: Taking Steps Today to Meet the Threats of Tomorrow]( "Nanotechnology Weapons: Taking Steps Today to Meet the Threats of Tomorrow")
Nanotechnology Weapons: Taking Steps Today to Meet the Threats of Tomorrow60,99 €![Preventive Attack in the 1990s?]( "Preventive Attack in the 1990s?")
Preventive Attack in the 1990s?60,99 €![Infantry Weapons: Observations and Personal Experiences of the Ordnance Officer, 2d Infantry Division]( "Infantry Weapons: Observations and Personal Experiences of the Ordnance Officer, 2d Infantry Division")
Infantry Weapons: Observations and Personal Experiences of the Ordnance Officer, 2d Infantry Division60,99 €![Preventive Attack in the 1990s?]( "Preventive Attack in the 1990s?")
Preventive Attack in the 1990s?60,99 €![Optimum Preventive Maintenance Policies for the AMRAAM Missile]( "Optimum Preventive Maintenance Policies for the AMRAAM Missile")
Optimum Preventive Maintenance Policies for the AMRAAM Missile60,99 €
This paper makes an important contribution to understanding how preventive force (overt/covert military strikes or war) can prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMD). A historical analysis will help create a strategic profile useful in determining a nations primary interests and probable future choices. The focus of the paper looks at preventive force and the ideological and structural constants of U.S foreign policy. Three detailed cases are presented. The first case considers President Trumans rejection of preventive force against the Soviet Union. The second case considers President Kennedys hawkish plans of preventive force against a nascent Communist Chinese nuclear program. The third case explores the Clinton administrations coercive threat of preventive force against North Korea during the 1994 Korean peninsula crisis.