This book is about normativity and reasons. But by the end the subject becomes the relation between self, thought and world. Skorupski argues that the key concepts of epistemology and moral theory are normative concepts, and that what makes them normative is that they depend on reasons. The concept of a reason is fundamental to all thought.
This book is about normativity and reasons. But by the end the subject becomes the relation between self, thought and world. Skorupski argues that the key concepts of epistemology and moral theory are normative concepts, and that what makes them normative is that they depend on reasons. The concept of a reason is fundamental to all thought.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
John Skorupski is Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of St Andrews.
Inhaltsangabe
Preface Synopsis I: Introduction Part One The Structure of Normative Concepts II: Reasons III: Indexicality, Universalisability and the Range of Reasons IV: Normativity V: Warrant Part Two Epistemic Reasons VI: The A Priori VII: Analyticity VIII: Modality IX: Non-monotonic Norms Part Three Evaluative and Practical Reasons X: Rational Explanation: Belief, Feeling and Will XI: Reasons and Feelings: (i) The Bridge Principle and the Concept of a Person's Good XII: Reasons and Feelings: (ii) Moral Concepts XIII: Impartiality (i) The Principle of Good XIV: Impartiality (ii) The Demand Principle XV: Moral Judgement and Feeling Part Four The Normative View XVI: The Epistemology of Reason Relations XVII: The Ontology of Reason Relations XVIII: Rules, Norms and Concepts XIX: Self and Self-Determination XX: The Critique of Reasons Appendix: Symbols, Terms and Theses References Index
Preface Synopsis I: Introduction Part One The Structure of Normative Concepts II: Reasons III: Indexicality, Universalisability and the Range of Reasons IV: Normativity V: Warrant Part Two Epistemic Reasons VI: The A Priori VII: Analyticity VIII: Modality IX: Non-monotonic Norms Part Three Evaluative and Practical Reasons X: Rational Explanation: Belief, Feeling and Will XI: Reasons and Feelings: (i) The Bridge Principle and the Concept of a Person's Good XII: Reasons and Feelings: (ii) Moral Concepts XIII: Impartiality (i) The Principle of Good XIV: Impartiality (ii) The Demand Principle XV: Moral Judgement and Feeling Part Four The Normative View XVI: The Epistemology of Reason Relations XVII: The Ontology of Reason Relations XVIII: Rules, Norms and Concepts XIX: Self and Self-Determination XX: The Critique of Reasons Appendix: Symbols, Terms and Theses References Index
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