Daniel Friedman, John Rust

The Double Auction Market

Institutions, Theories, And Evidence

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

This book focuses on markets organized as double auctions in which both buyers and sellers can submit bids and asks for standardized units of well-defined commodities and securities. It examines evidence from the laboratory and computer simulations.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Routledge
• Seitenzahl: 456
• Erscheinungstermin: 7. Mai 2019
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 235mm x 157mm x 29mm
• Gewicht: 806g
• ISBN-13: 9780367320508
• ISBN-10: 0367320509
• Artikelnr.: 57145974

Autorenporträt

Daniel Friedman

Inhaltsangabe

About the Santa Fe Institute
Santa Fe Institute Editorial Board June 1991
Santa Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity
Preface
Institutions
The Double Auction Market Institution: A Survey
Automating the Continuous Double Auction in Practice: Automated Trade Execution Systems in Financial Markets
Theories
Theories of Price Formation and Exchange in Double Oral Auctions
The Bayesian Theory of the k
Double Auction
Design of Efficient Trading Procedures
Behavior of Trading Automata in a Computerized Double Auction Market
Lower Bounds for Efficiency of Surplus Extraction in Double Auctions
Some Effects of Restricting the Electronic Order Book in an Automated Trade Execution System
An Empirical Analysis of Price Formation in Double Auction Markets
Buyer's Bid Double Auctions: Preliminary Experimental Results
Designing a Uniform
Price Double Auction: An Experimental Evaluation
On The Anatomy of the "Nonfacilitating" Features of the Double Auction Institution in Conspiratorial Markets
Convergence in Experimental Double Auctions for Stochastically Lived Assets
Liquidity and Persistence of Arbitrage in Experimental Options Markets