Eric Brousseau / Jean-Michel Glachant (eds.)
The Economics of Contracts
Theories and Applications
Herausgeber: Brousseau, Eric; Glachant, Jean-Michael; Eric, Brousseau
Eric Brousseau / Jean-Michel Glachant (eds.)
The Economics of Contracts
Theories and Applications
Herausgeber: Brousseau, Eric; Glachant, Jean-Michael; Eric, Brousseau
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A 2002 survey of economics of contracts appealing to scholars in economics, management and law.
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A 2002 survey of economics of contracts appealing to scholars in economics, management and law.
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Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 604
- Erscheinungstermin: 1. April 2010
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 235mm x 157mm x 40mm
- Gewicht: 1119g
- ISBN-13: 9780521814904
- ISBN-10: 0521814901
- Artikelnr.: 22697658
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 604
- Erscheinungstermin: 1. April 2010
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 235mm x 157mm x 40mm
- Gewicht: 1119g
- ISBN-13: 9780521814904
- ISBN-10: 0521814901
- Artikelnr.: 22697658
ERIC BROUSSEAU is Professor of Economics at the University of Paris X.
Part I. Introduction: 1 Economics of contracts and renewal of economic
analysis Eric Brousseau and Jean -Michel Glachant; Appendix: canonical
models of three different theories of contract M'hand Fares; Part II.
Contracts, Organizations and Institutions: 2. The new institutional
economics Ronald Coase; 3. Contract and economic organization Oliver
Williamson; 4. The role of incomplete contracts in self-enforcing
relationships Benjamin Klein; 5. Entrepreneurship, transaction costs and
the design of contracts Erik G. Furubotn; Part III. Law and Economics: 6.
The contract as economic exchange Jacques Ghestin; 7. Contract theory and
theories of contract regulation Alan Schwartz; 8. Economic reasoning and
the framing of contract law Victor Goldberg; 9. A transactions costs
approach to the analysis of property rights Gary Libecap; Part IV.
Theoretical Developments: Where Do We Stand?: 10. Transaction costs in
incentive theory David Martimort and Eric Malin; 11. Norms and the theory
of the firm Oliver Hart; 12. Liquidity constraint and the allocation of
control rights Philippe Aghion and Patrick Rey; 13. Complexity and contract
W. Bentley McLeod; 14. Authority, as flexibility, is the core of labour
contracts Olivier Favereau and Bernard Walliser; 15. Positive agency
theory: positioning and contribution Gerard Charreaux; Part V. Testing
Contract Theories: 16. Econometrics of contracts: an assessment of
developments in the empirical literature on contracting Scott Masten and
Stéphanie Saussier; 17. Experiments on moral hazard and incentives:
reciprocity and surplus sharing Marc Willinger and Claudia Keser; Part VI.
Applied Issues: Contributions to Industrial Organization: 18. Residual
claimancy rights and ongoing rents as incentive mechanisms in franchise
contracts: complements or substitutes? Francine Lafontaine and Emmanuel
Raynaud; 19. The quasi judicial role of large retailers Benito Arrunada;
20. Interconnection agreements: strategic behaviour and property rights
Godefroy Dang N'guyen and Thierry Penard; 21. Licensing in the chemical
industry Asish Aroroa and Andrea Fosfuri; Part VII. Policy Issues:
Anti-trust and Regulation of Public Utilities: 22. Inter-industry
agreements and European community competition law Michel Glais; 23.
Incentive contracts in utility regulation Matthew Bennett and Catherine
Waddams Price; 24. Contractual choice and performance: the case of water
supply in France Claude Ménard and Stéphane Saussier; 25. Institutional or
structural reform: sequencing strategies for reforming the electricity
industry Pablo Spiller and Guy Holburn; 26. Electricity sector
restructuring and competition Paul Joskow.
analysis Eric Brousseau and Jean -Michel Glachant; Appendix: canonical
models of three different theories of contract M'hand Fares; Part II.
Contracts, Organizations and Institutions: 2. The new institutional
economics Ronald Coase; 3. Contract and economic organization Oliver
Williamson; 4. The role of incomplete contracts in self-enforcing
relationships Benjamin Klein; 5. Entrepreneurship, transaction costs and
the design of contracts Erik G. Furubotn; Part III. Law and Economics: 6.
The contract as economic exchange Jacques Ghestin; 7. Contract theory and
theories of contract regulation Alan Schwartz; 8. Economic reasoning and
the framing of contract law Victor Goldberg; 9. A transactions costs
approach to the analysis of property rights Gary Libecap; Part IV.
Theoretical Developments: Where Do We Stand?: 10. Transaction costs in
incentive theory David Martimort and Eric Malin; 11. Norms and the theory
of the firm Oliver Hart; 12. Liquidity constraint and the allocation of
control rights Philippe Aghion and Patrick Rey; 13. Complexity and contract
W. Bentley McLeod; 14. Authority, as flexibility, is the core of labour
contracts Olivier Favereau and Bernard Walliser; 15. Positive agency
theory: positioning and contribution Gerard Charreaux; Part V. Testing
Contract Theories: 16. Econometrics of contracts: an assessment of
developments in the empirical literature on contracting Scott Masten and
Stéphanie Saussier; 17. Experiments on moral hazard and incentives:
reciprocity and surplus sharing Marc Willinger and Claudia Keser; Part VI.
Applied Issues: Contributions to Industrial Organization: 18. Residual
claimancy rights and ongoing rents as incentive mechanisms in franchise
contracts: complements or substitutes? Francine Lafontaine and Emmanuel
Raynaud; 19. The quasi judicial role of large retailers Benito Arrunada;
20. Interconnection agreements: strategic behaviour and property rights
Godefroy Dang N'guyen and Thierry Penard; 21. Licensing in the chemical
industry Asish Aroroa and Andrea Fosfuri; Part VII. Policy Issues:
Anti-trust and Regulation of Public Utilities: 22. Inter-industry
agreements and European community competition law Michel Glais; 23.
Incentive contracts in utility regulation Matthew Bennett and Catherine
Waddams Price; 24. Contractual choice and performance: the case of water
supply in France Claude Ménard and Stéphane Saussier; 25. Institutional or
structural reform: sequencing strategies for reforming the electricity
industry Pablo Spiller and Guy Holburn; 26. Electricity sector
restructuring and competition Paul Joskow.
Part I. Introduction: 1 Economics of contracts and renewal of economic
analysis Eric Brousseau and Jean -Michel Glachant; Appendix: canonical
models of three different theories of contract M'hand Fares; Part II.
Contracts, Organizations and Institutions: 2. The new institutional
economics Ronald Coase; 3. Contract and economic organization Oliver
Williamson; 4. The role of incomplete contracts in self-enforcing
relationships Benjamin Klein; 5. Entrepreneurship, transaction costs and
the design of contracts Erik G. Furubotn; Part III. Law and Economics: 6.
The contract as economic exchange Jacques Ghestin; 7. Contract theory and
theories of contract regulation Alan Schwartz; 8. Economic reasoning and
the framing of contract law Victor Goldberg; 9. A transactions costs
approach to the analysis of property rights Gary Libecap; Part IV.
Theoretical Developments: Where Do We Stand?: 10. Transaction costs in
incentive theory David Martimort and Eric Malin; 11. Norms and the theory
of the firm Oliver Hart; 12. Liquidity constraint and the allocation of
control rights Philippe Aghion and Patrick Rey; 13. Complexity and contract
W. Bentley McLeod; 14. Authority, as flexibility, is the core of labour
contracts Olivier Favereau and Bernard Walliser; 15. Positive agency
theory: positioning and contribution Gerard Charreaux; Part V. Testing
Contract Theories: 16. Econometrics of contracts: an assessment of
developments in the empirical literature on contracting Scott Masten and
Stéphanie Saussier; 17. Experiments on moral hazard and incentives:
reciprocity and surplus sharing Marc Willinger and Claudia Keser; Part VI.
Applied Issues: Contributions to Industrial Organization: 18. Residual
claimancy rights and ongoing rents as incentive mechanisms in franchise
contracts: complements or substitutes? Francine Lafontaine and Emmanuel
Raynaud; 19. The quasi judicial role of large retailers Benito Arrunada;
20. Interconnection agreements: strategic behaviour and property rights
Godefroy Dang N'guyen and Thierry Penard; 21. Licensing in the chemical
industry Asish Aroroa and Andrea Fosfuri; Part VII. Policy Issues:
Anti-trust and Regulation of Public Utilities: 22. Inter-industry
agreements and European community competition law Michel Glais; 23.
Incentive contracts in utility regulation Matthew Bennett and Catherine
Waddams Price; 24. Contractual choice and performance: the case of water
supply in France Claude Ménard and Stéphane Saussier; 25. Institutional or
structural reform: sequencing strategies for reforming the electricity
industry Pablo Spiller and Guy Holburn; 26. Electricity sector
restructuring and competition Paul Joskow.
analysis Eric Brousseau and Jean -Michel Glachant; Appendix: canonical
models of three different theories of contract M'hand Fares; Part II.
Contracts, Organizations and Institutions: 2. The new institutional
economics Ronald Coase; 3. Contract and economic organization Oliver
Williamson; 4. The role of incomplete contracts in self-enforcing
relationships Benjamin Klein; 5. Entrepreneurship, transaction costs and
the design of contracts Erik G. Furubotn; Part III. Law and Economics: 6.
The contract as economic exchange Jacques Ghestin; 7. Contract theory and
theories of contract regulation Alan Schwartz; 8. Economic reasoning and
the framing of contract law Victor Goldberg; 9. A transactions costs
approach to the analysis of property rights Gary Libecap; Part IV.
Theoretical Developments: Where Do We Stand?: 10. Transaction costs in
incentive theory David Martimort and Eric Malin; 11. Norms and the theory
of the firm Oliver Hart; 12. Liquidity constraint and the allocation of
control rights Philippe Aghion and Patrick Rey; 13. Complexity and contract
W. Bentley McLeod; 14. Authority, as flexibility, is the core of labour
contracts Olivier Favereau and Bernard Walliser; 15. Positive agency
theory: positioning and contribution Gerard Charreaux; Part V. Testing
Contract Theories: 16. Econometrics of contracts: an assessment of
developments in the empirical literature on contracting Scott Masten and
Stéphanie Saussier; 17. Experiments on moral hazard and incentives:
reciprocity and surplus sharing Marc Willinger and Claudia Keser; Part VI.
Applied Issues: Contributions to Industrial Organization: 18. Residual
claimancy rights and ongoing rents as incentive mechanisms in franchise
contracts: complements or substitutes? Francine Lafontaine and Emmanuel
Raynaud; 19. The quasi judicial role of large retailers Benito Arrunada;
20. Interconnection agreements: strategic behaviour and property rights
Godefroy Dang N'guyen and Thierry Penard; 21. Licensing in the chemical
industry Asish Aroroa and Andrea Fosfuri; Part VII. Policy Issues:
Anti-trust and Regulation of Public Utilities: 22. Inter-industry
agreements and European community competition law Michel Glais; 23.
Incentive contracts in utility regulation Matthew Bennett and Catherine
Waddams Price; 24. Contractual choice and performance: the case of water
supply in France Claude Ménard and Stéphane Saussier; 25. Institutional or
structural reform: sequencing strategies for reforming the electricity
industry Pablo Spiller and Guy Holburn; 26. Electricity sector
restructuring and competition Paul Joskow.