It describes both how and why franchising works. It also analyses the economic tensions that contribute to conflict in the franchisor-franchisee relationship. The book includes a great deal of empirical evidence on franchising not available anywhere else. The economic analysis of the franchisor-franchisee relationship begins with the observation that for franchisors, franchising is a contractual alternative to vertical integration. Subsequently, various sources of tension between franchisors and franchisees are examined in turn, including issues related to product quality control, tying…mehr
It describes both how and why franchising works. It also analyses the economic tensions that contribute to conflict in the franchisor-franchisee relationship. The book includes a great deal of empirical evidence on franchising not available anywhere else. The economic analysis of the franchisor-franchisee relationship begins with the observation that for franchisors, franchising is a contractual alternative to vertical integration. Subsequently, various sources of tension between franchisors and franchisees are examined in turn, including issues related to product quality control, tying arrangements, pricing, location and territories, advertising, and termination and renewals.
Roger D. Blair is Huber Hurst Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Florida where he has served on the faculty since 1970. He teaches courses in antitrust economics, law and economics, and the economics of sports. Professor Blair has published 165 articles and chapters in books, primarily in economics journals and law reviews. He has served as an antitrust consultant to the US Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, the Attorneys General of California, Arizona, Missouri, Oregon, Washington and Florida, and numerous corporations. The books he has coauthored include Antitrust Economics, Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control, Monopsony: Antitrust Law and Economics, and forthcoming from Cambridge University Press Intellectual Property: Economics and Legal Dimensions of Rights and Remedies with Thomas F. Cotter.
Inhaltsangabe
Preface 1. Introduction 2. Four popular misconceptions about franchising 3. Franchise contracts 4. Franchising, vertical integration, and vertical restraints 5. Quality control 6. Franchise tying contracts 7. Vertical price controls in franchising 8. Encroachment 9. Advertising and promotion 10. Termination and non-renewal 11. Concluding remarks.
