This 2005 book describes in much detail both how and why franchising works. It also analyses the economic tensions that contribute to conflict in the franchisor-franchisee relationship. The book includes a great deal of empirical evidence on franchising and its importance in various segments of the economy.
This 2005 book describes in much detail both how and why franchising works. It also analyses the economic tensions that contribute to conflict in the franchisor-franchisee relationship. The book includes a great deal of empirical evidence on franchising and its importance in various segments of the economy.
Roger D. Blair is Huber Hurst Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Florida where he has served on the faculty since 1970. He teaches courses in antitrust economics, law and economics, and the economics of sports. Professor Blair has published 165 articles and chapters in books, primarily in economics journals and law reviews. He has served as an antitrust consultant to the US Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, the Attorneys General of California, Arizona, Missouri, Oregon, Washington and Florida, and numerous corporations. The books he has coauthored include Antitrust Economics, Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control, Monopsony: Antitrust Law and Economics, and forthcoming from Cambridge University Press Intellectual Property: Economics and Legal Dimensions of Rights and Remedies with Thomas F. Cotter.
Inhaltsangabe
Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. Four popular misconceptions about franchising; 3. Franchise contracts; 4. Franchising, vertical integration, and vertical restraints; 5. Quality control; 6. Franchise tying contracts; 7. Vertical price controls in franchising; 8. Encroachment; 9. Advertising and promotion; 10. Termination and non-renewal; 11. Concluding remarks.
