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In this first English translation, former Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis examines the European debt crisis with particular reference to the case of Greece
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In this first English translation, former Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis examines the European debt crisis with particular reference to the case of Greece
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Manchester University Press
- Seitenzahl: 366
- Erscheinungstermin: 30. April 2014
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 240mm x 161mm x 24mm
- Gewicht: 713g
- ISBN-13: 9780719095795
- ISBN-10: 0719095794
- Artikelnr.: 40477930
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- gpsr@libri.de
- Verlag: Manchester University Press
- Seitenzahl: 366
- Erscheinungstermin: 30. April 2014
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 240mm x 161mm x 24mm
- Gewicht: 713g
- ISBN-13: 9780719095795
- ISBN-10: 0719095794
- Artikelnr.: 40477930
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- gpsr@libri.de
Costas Simitis was the Prime Minister of Greece from 1996 to 2004
Preface Part I: How we arrived at this first Memorandum 1. Was Greece ready
for the Euro? 2. New Democracy's criminal indifference 3. PASOK's
opportunistic optimism 4. Being in denial 5. Ineffective solutions 6. The
bitter truth 7. The first Memorandum: a medicine with dangerous side
effects Part II: The Memorandum's first year of implementation 8. The
crisis spreads to the Union 9. Implementing the Memorandum: an obstacle
race 10. 'An all encompassing plan' to solve the crisis in the Eurozone?
11. 'An all encompassing plan' to solve the crisis in Greece? 12. A year of
the Memorandum: seeking a new solution Part III: Debt restructuring and
power games 13. Debt restructuring: The decisions of 21st July 14. A dead
end 15. More hitches 16. The new solution 17. Political games with
unpredictable consequences Part IV: Coalition government, psi, second
Memorandum 18. A flicker of hope 19. Conflicts at the highest European
level 20. The new agreement with the Eurozone (Memorandum II), the PSI 21.
An evaluation of the Memorandum(s) 22. Austerity and growth: implementing
the decisions of 21st February 2012 23. The crisis peaks Part V: Elections
May-June 2012 24. Elections of 6th May: Euro or drachma? 25. Cracks in the
Euro 26. The Union at a dead end: change of course on 29th June 27. The
elections of 17th June: a new beginning? 28. Provisional solutions. October
2012-June 2013 29. The evaluations of the assistance programme to Greece
30. Cyprus Part VI: The future of Greece and the European Union 31. The
causes of the crisis are not only economic 32. A new European policy is
necessary A. Economic governance B. Inclusion and participation Appendix:
Key meetings and decisions of the institutions of the European Union
relating to the financial crisis Note. The main Greek political parties
Figure 1: Net borrowing of Greek government and economy (% of GDP) Figure
2: Greece. Primary expenditure, expenditure, revenue 1988-2014
Abbreviations Index
for the Euro? 2. New Democracy's criminal indifference 3. PASOK's
opportunistic optimism 4. Being in denial 5. Ineffective solutions 6. The
bitter truth 7. The first Memorandum: a medicine with dangerous side
effects Part II: The Memorandum's first year of implementation 8. The
crisis spreads to the Union 9. Implementing the Memorandum: an obstacle
race 10. 'An all encompassing plan' to solve the crisis in the Eurozone?
11. 'An all encompassing plan' to solve the crisis in Greece? 12. A year of
the Memorandum: seeking a new solution Part III: Debt restructuring and
power games 13. Debt restructuring: The decisions of 21st July 14. A dead
end 15. More hitches 16. The new solution 17. Political games with
unpredictable consequences Part IV: Coalition government, psi, second
Memorandum 18. A flicker of hope 19. Conflicts at the highest European
level 20. The new agreement with the Eurozone (Memorandum II), the PSI 21.
An evaluation of the Memorandum(s) 22. Austerity and growth: implementing
the decisions of 21st February 2012 23. The crisis peaks Part V: Elections
May-June 2012 24. Elections of 6th May: Euro or drachma? 25. Cracks in the
Euro 26. The Union at a dead end: change of course on 29th June 27. The
elections of 17th June: a new beginning? 28. Provisional solutions. October
2012-June 2013 29. The evaluations of the assistance programme to Greece
30. Cyprus Part VI: The future of Greece and the European Union 31. The
causes of the crisis are not only economic 32. A new European policy is
necessary A. Economic governance B. Inclusion and participation Appendix:
Key meetings and decisions of the institutions of the European Union
relating to the financial crisis Note. The main Greek political parties
Figure 1: Net borrowing of Greek government and economy (% of GDP) Figure
2: Greece. Primary expenditure, expenditure, revenue 1988-2014
Abbreviations Index
Preface Part I: How we arrived at this first Memorandum 1. Was Greece ready
for the Euro? 2. New Democracy's criminal indifference 3. PASOK's
opportunistic optimism 4. Being in denial 5. Ineffective solutions 6. The
bitter truth 7. The first Memorandum: a medicine with dangerous side
effects Part II: The Memorandum's first year of implementation 8. The
crisis spreads to the Union 9. Implementing the Memorandum: an obstacle
race 10. 'An all encompassing plan' to solve the crisis in the Eurozone?
11. 'An all encompassing plan' to solve the crisis in Greece? 12. A year of
the Memorandum: seeking a new solution Part III: Debt restructuring and
power games 13. Debt restructuring: The decisions of 21st July 14. A dead
end 15. More hitches 16. The new solution 17. Political games with
unpredictable consequences Part IV: Coalition government, psi, second
Memorandum 18. A flicker of hope 19. Conflicts at the highest European
level 20. The new agreement with the Eurozone (Memorandum II), the PSI 21.
An evaluation of the Memorandum(s) 22. Austerity and growth: implementing
the decisions of 21st February 2012 23. The crisis peaks Part V: Elections
May-June 2012 24. Elections of 6th May: Euro or drachma? 25. Cracks in the
Euro 26. The Union at a dead end: change of course on 29th June 27. The
elections of 17th June: a new beginning? 28. Provisional solutions. October
2012-June 2013 29. The evaluations of the assistance programme to Greece
30. Cyprus Part VI: The future of Greece and the European Union 31. The
causes of the crisis are not only economic 32. A new European policy is
necessary A. Economic governance B. Inclusion and participation Appendix:
Key meetings and decisions of the institutions of the European Union
relating to the financial crisis Note. The main Greek political parties
Figure 1: Net borrowing of Greek government and economy (% of GDP) Figure
2: Greece. Primary expenditure, expenditure, revenue 1988-2014
Abbreviations Index
for the Euro? 2. New Democracy's criminal indifference 3. PASOK's
opportunistic optimism 4. Being in denial 5. Ineffective solutions 6. The
bitter truth 7. The first Memorandum: a medicine with dangerous side
effects Part II: The Memorandum's first year of implementation 8. The
crisis spreads to the Union 9. Implementing the Memorandum: an obstacle
race 10. 'An all encompassing plan' to solve the crisis in the Eurozone?
11. 'An all encompassing plan' to solve the crisis in Greece? 12. A year of
the Memorandum: seeking a new solution Part III: Debt restructuring and
power games 13. Debt restructuring: The decisions of 21st July 14. A dead
end 15. More hitches 16. The new solution 17. Political games with
unpredictable consequences Part IV: Coalition government, psi, second
Memorandum 18. A flicker of hope 19. Conflicts at the highest European
level 20. The new agreement with the Eurozone (Memorandum II), the PSI 21.
An evaluation of the Memorandum(s) 22. Austerity and growth: implementing
the decisions of 21st February 2012 23. The crisis peaks Part V: Elections
May-June 2012 24. Elections of 6th May: Euro or drachma? 25. Cracks in the
Euro 26. The Union at a dead end: change of course on 29th June 27. The
elections of 17th June: a new beginning? 28. Provisional solutions. October
2012-June 2013 29. The evaluations of the assistance programme to Greece
30. Cyprus Part VI: The future of Greece and the European Union 31. The
causes of the crisis are not only economic 32. A new European policy is
necessary A. Economic governance B. Inclusion and participation Appendix:
Key meetings and decisions of the institutions of the European Union
relating to the financial crisis Note. The main Greek political parties
Figure 1: Net borrowing of Greek government and economy (% of GDP) Figure
2: Greece. Primary expenditure, expenditure, revenue 1988-2014
Abbreviations Index