This book explains the evolution of human cooperation in tribal societies using insights from game theory, ethnography and archaeology.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Charles Stanish is Director Emeritus of the Cotsen Institute of Archaeology and Professor of Anthropology at University of California, Los Angeles. Author of numerous articles and several books including Ancient Titicaca (2003) and Ancient Andean Political Economy (1992), he specializes in the evolution of co-operation in the premodern world and has conducted extensive fieldwork throughout South America in Peru, Bolivia and Chile.
Inhaltsangabe
Preface 1. The evolution of human cooperation 2. Economic anthropology of stateless societies: the rise and fall of homo economicus 3. Conditional cooperators: the evolutionary game theory revolution 4. The role of coercion in social theory 5. The ritualized economy: how people in stateless societies cooperate 6. An anthropological game theory model for the evolution of ritualized economies 7. The evolution of ritualized economies: the archaeological evidence 8. Epilogue: 'no beans, no Jesus'.
Preface 1. The evolution of human cooperation 2. Economic anthropology of stateless societies: the rise and fall of homo economicus 3. Conditional cooperators: the evolutionary game theory revolution 4. The role of coercion in social theory 5. The ritualized economy: how people in stateless societies cooperate 6. An anthropological game theory model for the evolution of ritualized economies 7. The evolution of ritualized economies: the archaeological evidence 8. Epilogue: 'no beans, no Jesus'.
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