M. A. Roberts introduces the newcomer to population ethics and investigates the key issues in a way that will be of interest to professional philosophers, economists, lawyers, and students in all those areas who seek to understand what a cogent, intuitively plausible theory of population will look like. To that end, Roberts presents five perplexing but telling existence puzzles that already are or shall soon become important parts of the population ethics literature: the Asymmetry Puzzle, the Pareto Puzzle, the Addition Puzzle, the Anonymity Puzzle, and the Better Chance Puzzle. Roberts…mehr
M. A. Roberts introduces the newcomer to population ethics and investigates the key issues in a way that will be of interest to professional philosophers, economists, lawyers, and students in all those areas who seek to understand what a cogent, intuitively plausible theory of population will look like. To that end, Roberts presents five perplexing but telling existence puzzles that already are or shall soon become important parts of the population ethics literature: the Asymmetry Puzzle, the Pareto Puzzle, the Addition Puzzle, the Anonymity Puzzle, and the Better Chance Puzzle. Roberts develops solutions to the puzzles that together form a partial theory of population, a collection of principles grounded in intuition but highly sensitive to the formal demands of consistency and cogency.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
M. A. Roberts is a professor of philosophy at the College of New Jersey. Her articles in population ethics have appeared in Ethics, Analysis, Theoria, Utilitas, Theory and Decision, Journal of Applied Philosophy, Law and Economics and elsewhere. She is the author of Abortion and the Moral Significance of Merely Possible Persons and Child Versus Childmaker.
Inhaltsangabe
* Acknowledgments * Dedication * List of accepted principles and rejected principles * Lists of figures * Preface * Chapter 1: Recent history and current perplexed state of population ethics * 1.1 Population variability and the inquiry into existential status * 1.2 The case of Jaime versus Harry * 1.3 A quick turn back to traditional total view * 1.4 More than one way to maximize: maximizing on the aggregate; maximizing on the individual * 1.5 Are hormones to blame? * 1.6 Conceptual necessities also puzzle pieces; more inventive approaches on hold * 1.7 The puzzle method; the role of intuition; the off ramp * 1.8 Connection thesis; accessibility relation * 1.9 Five existence puzzles * Chapter 2: The Asymmetry Puzzle * 2.1 The miserable child case and the happy child case * 2.2 The puzzle * 2.3 Attempts to solve the puzzle that go nowhere * 2.4 The existence-sensitive solution to the asymmetry * 2.5 Objections and replies * Chapter 3: The Pareto puzzle * 3.1 The three option case * 3.2 The puzzle * 3.3 Attempts to solve the puzzle by tossing out some of the puzzle pieces * 3.4 The Pareto minus solution to the Pareto puzzle * 3.5 Objection and reply: Doesn't the Pareto minus solution violate the independence of irrelevant alternatives? * Chapter 4: The Addition Puzzle * 4.1 The puzzle * 4.2 Why we love addition * 4.3 Inversive existence-sensitive solution to the addition puzzle * 4.4 Objection and reply: Isn't inversive existence-sensitive addition circular? * 4.5 Applications of inversive existence-sensitive addition * 4.6 Wouldn't it be simpler to "minimize aggregate complaints"? * Chapter 5: The Anonymity Puzzle * 5.1 The case of simple addition and reversal * 5.2 The case of indefinitely iterated addition and reversal; the puzzle * 5.3 When the cures are worse than the disease * 5.4 Identity-sensitive solution to the anonymity puzzle * 5.5 Objections and replies * Chapter 6: The Better Chance Puzzle * 6.1 Probability questions * 6.2 Expected value: the wrong way to make a wrong a right * 6.3 Probable value: a better way to make a wrong a right * 6.4 Objections and replies * Chapter 7: Person-based consequentialism and a New Way of Doing the Best We Can * Appendix A: Nonexistence Comparability * Appendix B: The Loss Distinction Thesis * Appendix C: Broome on the Neutrality Intuition * Index * Bibliography
* Acknowledgments * Dedication * List of accepted principles and rejected principles * Lists of figures * Preface * Chapter 1: Recent history and current perplexed state of population ethics * 1.1 Population variability and the inquiry into existential status * 1.2 The case of Jaime versus Harry * 1.3 A quick turn back to traditional total view * 1.4 More than one way to maximize: maximizing on the aggregate; maximizing on the individual * 1.5 Are hormones to blame? * 1.6 Conceptual necessities also puzzle pieces; more inventive approaches on hold * 1.7 The puzzle method; the role of intuition; the off ramp * 1.8 Connection thesis; accessibility relation * 1.9 Five existence puzzles * Chapter 2: The Asymmetry Puzzle * 2.1 The miserable child case and the happy child case * 2.2 The puzzle * 2.3 Attempts to solve the puzzle that go nowhere * 2.4 The existence-sensitive solution to the asymmetry * 2.5 Objections and replies * Chapter 3: The Pareto puzzle * 3.1 The three option case * 3.2 The puzzle * 3.3 Attempts to solve the puzzle by tossing out some of the puzzle pieces * 3.4 The Pareto minus solution to the Pareto puzzle * 3.5 Objection and reply: Doesn't the Pareto minus solution violate the independence of irrelevant alternatives? * Chapter 4: The Addition Puzzle * 4.1 The puzzle * 4.2 Why we love addition * 4.3 Inversive existence-sensitive solution to the addition puzzle * 4.4 Objection and reply: Isn't inversive existence-sensitive addition circular? * 4.5 Applications of inversive existence-sensitive addition * 4.6 Wouldn't it be simpler to "minimize aggregate complaints"? * Chapter 5: The Anonymity Puzzle * 5.1 The case of simple addition and reversal * 5.2 The case of indefinitely iterated addition and reversal; the puzzle * 5.3 When the cures are worse than the disease * 5.4 Identity-sensitive solution to the anonymity puzzle * 5.5 Objections and replies * Chapter 6: The Better Chance Puzzle * 6.1 Probability questions * 6.2 Expected value: the wrong way to make a wrong a right * 6.3 Probable value: a better way to make a wrong a right * 6.4 Objections and replies * Chapter 7: Person-based consequentialism and a New Way of Doing the Best We Can * Appendix A: Nonexistence Comparability * Appendix B: The Loss Distinction Thesis * Appendix C: Broome on the Neutrality Intuition * Index * Bibliography
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