Dorit A Ganson
The Explanationist Defense of Scientific Realism
Dorit A Ganson
The Explanationist Defense of Scientific Realism
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First Published in 2001. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
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First Published in 2001. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Taylor & Francis
- Seitenzahl: 224
- Erscheinungstermin: 27. Januar 2017
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 12mm
- Gewicht: 304g
- ISBN-13: 9781138969360
- ISBN-10: 1138969362
- Artikelnr.: 57053580
- Verlag: Taylor & Francis
- Seitenzahl: 224
- Erscheinungstermin: 27. Januar 2017
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 12mm
- Gewicht: 304g
- ISBN-13: 9781138969360
- ISBN-10: 1138969362
- Artikelnr.: 57053580
Dorit A. Ganson is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Oberlin College.
Preface
1. Introduction
I. Explanationism
I.i The Debate About Realism and the Constraints of Rationality
I.ii Versions of Explanationism/Realism
I.iii Externalist vs. Internalist Explanationist Approaches to Defending Realism
II. Miller's Internalist Explanationism
II.i Introducing Topic-Specific Truisms
II.ii The Role of Truisms in the Explanationist Defense of Realism
II.iii Why Truisms are Independent Marks of Rationality
III.iv Unfinished Business in Miller's Program
2. Acausal Models of Explanation
II.i Hume's Legacy and the Deductive-Nomological Model
II.ii From the Inductive-Statistical Model to the Statistical Relevance Approach
III. The Statistical Relevance Model of Explanation
III.i An Outline of the Model and some Refinements
III.ii The Requirement of Objective Homogeneity
III.iii Salmon's Acausal Criteria for Admissible Selection Rules and Ensuing Problems
III.iv Difficulties in the Identification of Causal Relevance with Statistical Relevance
3. Van Fraassen's Arguments Against Inference to the Best Explanation
I. Van Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism
II. Building a Case Against Explanationism: The Short Arguments
II.i The Scientific Image
II.ii Laws and Symmetry
III. The Bayesian Peter Objection
III.i Van Fraassen's Dutch Book Argument
III.ii Flaws in the Argument
III.iii Reconciling Explanationism with Bayes' Theorem
4. Van Fraassen's Dutch Books
I. A Philosophical Application of the Probability Calculus: Using Dutch Book Arguments to Derive Rationality Constraints
II. The Principle of Reflection
III. The Temporally Extended Principle of Reflection
IV. A Prohibition Against Assigning A Probability Value to some Special Conditional Propositions
5. Varieties of Explanationism and Fine's Critique
I. Smart's Wouldn't It be a Miracle? Argument
II. Boyd's Arguments for Realism
II.i Boyd's Inference to the Best Explanation
II.ii Rival Explanans and Explanandum
II.iii The Circularity Objection and the Realist Package
III. Naturalized vs. Non-naturalized Realism
6. The Transcendental Road to Realism
I. Fine's Criticisms of Miller's Realism
II. The True Source of Unreasonable Doubt
III. Why Taking on Isn't Good Enough
IV. Salvaging Realism about Molecules
Appendix
I. The Ralist Account of Broad Empirical Scope (and its Bayesian Justification)
II. Van Fraassen's UnBayesian Rejection of Broad Scope as an Epistemically Relevant Virtue
Works Cited
Index
1. Introduction
I. Explanationism
I.i The Debate About Realism and the Constraints of Rationality
I.ii Versions of Explanationism/Realism
I.iii Externalist vs. Internalist Explanationist Approaches to Defending Realism
II. Miller's Internalist Explanationism
II.i Introducing Topic-Specific Truisms
II.ii The Role of Truisms in the Explanationist Defense of Realism
II.iii Why Truisms are Independent Marks of Rationality
III.iv Unfinished Business in Miller's Program
2. Acausal Models of Explanation
II.i Hume's Legacy and the Deductive-Nomological Model
II.ii From the Inductive-Statistical Model to the Statistical Relevance Approach
III. The Statistical Relevance Model of Explanation
III.i An Outline of the Model and some Refinements
III.ii The Requirement of Objective Homogeneity
III.iii Salmon's Acausal Criteria for Admissible Selection Rules and Ensuing Problems
III.iv Difficulties in the Identification of Causal Relevance with Statistical Relevance
3. Van Fraassen's Arguments Against Inference to the Best Explanation
I. Van Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism
II. Building a Case Against Explanationism: The Short Arguments
II.i The Scientific Image
II.ii Laws and Symmetry
III. The Bayesian Peter Objection
III.i Van Fraassen's Dutch Book Argument
III.ii Flaws in the Argument
III.iii Reconciling Explanationism with Bayes' Theorem
4. Van Fraassen's Dutch Books
I. A Philosophical Application of the Probability Calculus: Using Dutch Book Arguments to Derive Rationality Constraints
II. The Principle of Reflection
III. The Temporally Extended Principle of Reflection
IV. A Prohibition Against Assigning A Probability Value to some Special Conditional Propositions
5. Varieties of Explanationism and Fine's Critique
I. Smart's Wouldn't It be a Miracle? Argument
II. Boyd's Arguments for Realism
II.i Boyd's Inference to the Best Explanation
II.ii Rival Explanans and Explanandum
II.iii The Circularity Objection and the Realist Package
III. Naturalized vs. Non-naturalized Realism
6. The Transcendental Road to Realism
I. Fine's Criticisms of Miller's Realism
II. The True Source of Unreasonable Doubt
III. Why Taking on Isn't Good Enough
IV. Salvaging Realism about Molecules
Appendix
I. The Ralist Account of Broad Empirical Scope (and its Bayesian Justification)
II. Van Fraassen's UnBayesian Rejection of Broad Scope as an Epistemically Relevant Virtue
Works Cited
Index
Preface
1. Introduction
I. Explanationism
I.i The Debate About Realism and the Constraints of Rationality
I.ii Versions of Explanationism/Realism
I.iii Externalist vs. Internalist Explanationist Approaches to Defending Realism
II. Miller's Internalist Explanationism
II.i Introducing Topic-Specific Truisms
II.ii The Role of Truisms in the Explanationist Defense of Realism
II.iii Why Truisms are Independent Marks of Rationality
III.iv Unfinished Business in Miller's Program
2. Acausal Models of Explanation
II.i Hume's Legacy and the Deductive-Nomological Model
II.ii From the Inductive-Statistical Model to the Statistical Relevance Approach
III. The Statistical Relevance Model of Explanation
III.i An Outline of the Model and some Refinements
III.ii The Requirement of Objective Homogeneity
III.iii Salmon's Acausal Criteria for Admissible Selection Rules and Ensuing Problems
III.iv Difficulties in the Identification of Causal Relevance with Statistical Relevance
3. Van Fraassen's Arguments Against Inference to the Best Explanation
I. Van Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism
II. Building a Case Against Explanationism: The Short Arguments
II.i The Scientific Image
II.ii Laws and Symmetry
III. The Bayesian Peter Objection
III.i Van Fraassen's Dutch Book Argument
III.ii Flaws in the Argument
III.iii Reconciling Explanationism with Bayes' Theorem
4. Van Fraassen's Dutch Books
I. A Philosophical Application of the Probability Calculus: Using Dutch Book Arguments to Derive Rationality Constraints
II. The Principle of Reflection
III. The Temporally Extended Principle of Reflection
IV. A Prohibition Against Assigning A Probability Value to some Special Conditional Propositions
5. Varieties of Explanationism and Fine's Critique
I. Smart's Wouldn't It be a Miracle? Argument
II. Boyd's Arguments for Realism
II.i Boyd's Inference to the Best Explanation
II.ii Rival Explanans and Explanandum
II.iii The Circularity Objection and the Realist Package
III. Naturalized vs. Non-naturalized Realism
6. The Transcendental Road to Realism
I. Fine's Criticisms of Miller's Realism
II. The True Source of Unreasonable Doubt
III. Why Taking on Isn't Good Enough
IV. Salvaging Realism about Molecules
Appendix
I. The Ralist Account of Broad Empirical Scope (and its Bayesian Justification)
II. Van Fraassen's UnBayesian Rejection of Broad Scope as an Epistemically Relevant Virtue
Works Cited
Index
1. Introduction
I. Explanationism
I.i The Debate About Realism and the Constraints of Rationality
I.ii Versions of Explanationism/Realism
I.iii Externalist vs. Internalist Explanationist Approaches to Defending Realism
II. Miller's Internalist Explanationism
II.i Introducing Topic-Specific Truisms
II.ii The Role of Truisms in the Explanationist Defense of Realism
II.iii Why Truisms are Independent Marks of Rationality
III.iv Unfinished Business in Miller's Program
2. Acausal Models of Explanation
II.i Hume's Legacy and the Deductive-Nomological Model
II.ii From the Inductive-Statistical Model to the Statistical Relevance Approach
III. The Statistical Relevance Model of Explanation
III.i An Outline of the Model and some Refinements
III.ii The Requirement of Objective Homogeneity
III.iii Salmon's Acausal Criteria for Admissible Selection Rules and Ensuing Problems
III.iv Difficulties in the Identification of Causal Relevance with Statistical Relevance
3. Van Fraassen's Arguments Against Inference to the Best Explanation
I. Van Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism
II. Building a Case Against Explanationism: The Short Arguments
II.i The Scientific Image
II.ii Laws and Symmetry
III. The Bayesian Peter Objection
III.i Van Fraassen's Dutch Book Argument
III.ii Flaws in the Argument
III.iii Reconciling Explanationism with Bayes' Theorem
4. Van Fraassen's Dutch Books
I. A Philosophical Application of the Probability Calculus: Using Dutch Book Arguments to Derive Rationality Constraints
II. The Principle of Reflection
III. The Temporally Extended Principle of Reflection
IV. A Prohibition Against Assigning A Probability Value to some Special Conditional Propositions
5. Varieties of Explanationism and Fine's Critique
I. Smart's Wouldn't It be a Miracle? Argument
II. Boyd's Arguments for Realism
II.i Boyd's Inference to the Best Explanation
II.ii Rival Explanans and Explanandum
II.iii The Circularity Objection and the Realist Package
III. Naturalized vs. Non-naturalized Realism
6. The Transcendental Road to Realism
I. Fine's Criticisms of Miller's Realism
II. The True Source of Unreasonable Doubt
III. Why Taking on Isn't Good Enough
IV. Salvaging Realism about Molecules
Appendix
I. The Ralist Account of Broad Empirical Scope (and its Bayesian Justification)
II. Van Fraassen's UnBayesian Rejection of Broad Scope as an Epistemically Relevant Virtue
Works Cited
Index