What is given to us in conscious experience? Michelle Montague offers a new answer, and thus contributes to a general theory of mental content. She analyses conscious perception, conscious emotion, and conscious thought, and argues that all experience essentially involves four things: content, intentionality, phenomenology, and consciousness.
What is given to us in conscious experience? Michelle Montague offers a new answer, and thus contributes to a general theory of mental content. She analyses conscious perception, conscious emotion, and conscious thought, and argues that all experience essentially involves four things: content, intentionality, phenomenology, and consciousness.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Michelle Montague received a PhD in philosophy from the University of Colorado, Boulder, in 2002. She is currently an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin. She was previously an Assistant Professor at the University of California, Irvine, from 2002 to 2007 and a senior lecturer at the University of Bristol from 2008 to 2013. She has been a visiting professor and scholar at Princeton University, MIT, ANU, the University of Copenhagen, and the University of London. Her primary interests are philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and metaphysics.
Inhaltsangabe
* Introduction * 1: Intentionality, phenomenology, consciousness, and content * 2: A Brentanian theory of content * 3: Awareness of awareness * 4: P. F. Strawson's datum * 5: Brentanianism, standard representationalism, and Fregean representationalism * 6: Perception of physical objects: the phenomenological particularity fact * 7: Perception of physical objects: the access problem * 8: Cognitive phenomenology: what is given in conscious thought * 9: Evaluative phenomenology: what is given in conscious emotion * Concluding remarks
* Introduction * 1: Intentionality, phenomenology, consciousness, and content * 2: A Brentanian theory of content * 3: Awareness of awareness * 4: P. F. Strawson's datum * 5: Brentanianism, standard representationalism, and Fregean representationalism * 6: Perception of physical objects: the phenomenological particularity fact * 7: Perception of physical objects: the access problem * 8: Cognitive phenomenology: what is given in conscious thought * 9: Evaluative phenomenology: what is given in conscious emotion * Concluding remarks
Es gelten unsere Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen: www.buecher.de/agb
Impressum
www.buecher.de ist ein Internetauftritt der buecher.de internetstores GmbH
Geschäftsführung: Monica Sawhney | Roland Kölbl | Günter Hilger
Sitz der Gesellschaft: Batheyer Straße 115 - 117, 58099 Hagen
Postanschrift: Bürgermeister-Wegele-Str. 12, 86167 Augsburg
Amtsgericht Hagen HRB 13257
Steuernummer: 321/5800/1497
USt-IdNr: DE450055826