1. Disposition of the Allied armies after the battle of the Alma
2. Importance of prompt advance after the victory
3. Advance on the Katcha
4. The design of operating against Sebastopol from the north
5. The allies ignorant of the enemy's movements
6. Lord Raglan's visit to St. Arnaud
7. Absence of interdependence among the hostile armies
8. Sebastopol on the day of the Alma
9. Power the Allies had of seizing the enemy's communications
10. Mentschikoff's distribution of the command at Sebastopol
11. Inquiry suggested by the condition of the town at the end of September
12. Help available to the besiegers from the presence of the fleet
13. Disposition of the Allied armies
14. The landing of the siege-trains
15. Desire that the fleets should take part in the attack
16. The fate of Sebastopol was for some hours in suspense
17. Conditions favourable to the prospects of the garrison
Appendix.
