Can OUGHT be derived from IS? This book presents an investigation of this time-honored problem by means of alethic-deontic predicate logic. New in this study is the leitmotif of relevance: is-ought inferences indeed exist, but they are all irrelevant in a precise logical sense. New proof techniques establish this result for very broad classes of logics. A profound philosophical analysis of is-ought bridge principles supplements the logical study. The final results imply incisive limitations for the justifiability of ethics as opposed to empirical science.
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`... anyone interested in deontic logic should benefit from the insights of this book. ... the work is clearly written and excellently edited.'
History and Philosophy of Logic, 19 (1998)
History and Philosophy of Logic, 19 (1998)
`... anyone interested in deontic logic should benefit from the insights of this book. ... the work is clearly written and excellently edited.'
History and Philosophy of Logic, 19 (1998)
History and Philosophy of Logic, 19 (1998)