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This book sheds light on the so-called 'Moro Doctrine', an Italian state security policy which has been portrayed in literature as an under-the-counter agreement made between Italy and Palestinian movement during the Cold War. The Moro Doctrine, or 'Lodo Moro' as it is known in Italy, aimed to protect the peninsula from Palestinian attacks by allowing terrorists to use Italian territory as a base for weapons and guerrilla fighters.
Responsibility for the 'Lodo' was instrumentally placed on Aldo Moro, the five- time Prime Minister of Italy, after his death, and since then his name has become indelibly linked with the shame of having negotiated with Palestinian terrorists.
Thanks to records collected from over twenty archives in Italy, the USA, France, Germany, Britain and Russia, concrete evidence shows that the significance of this agreement needs to be rethought. The author argues that the decision to adopt the Lodo was not solely made by Moro, but also involved key figures of the Christian Democrat and Socialist parties, various magistrates and even the President of the Republic. It illustrates how terrorism was used as an effective tool in international diplomacy to influence foreign and domestic policies.
Offering a re-examination of Italian counter-terrorist policy, this book analyses how Italy responded to international terrorism during the Cold War, providing a useful read for those researching Italian and European history, Cold War studies, the history of international relations and diplomacy, and Middle-East history.
Responsibility for the 'Lodo' was instrumentally placed on Aldo Moro, the five- time Prime Minister of Italy, after his death, and since then his name has become indelibly linked with the shame of having negotiated with Palestinian terrorists.
Thanks to records collected from over twenty archives in Italy, the USA, France, Germany, Britain and Russia, concrete evidence shows that the significance of this agreement needs to be rethought. The author argues that the decision to adopt the Lodo was not solely made by Moro, but also involved key figures of the Christian Democrat and Socialist parties, various magistrates and even the President of the Republic. It illustrates how terrorism was used as an effective tool in international diplomacy to influence foreign and domestic policies.
Offering a re-examination of Italian counter-terrorist policy, this book analyses how Italy responded to international terrorism during the Cold War, providing a useful read for those researching Italian and European history, Cold War studies, the history of international relations and diplomacy, and Middle-East history.
"... Zusammengefasst handelt es sich bei "The Italian State and International Terrorism" um eine gut lesbare Studie, die einen wichtigen Beitrag zum Verständnis der 1970er und 1980er Terrorjahre leistet. Das ist insbesondere ein Gewinn, weil gerade hinsichtlich der Betrachtung der italienischen Ereignisse im deutschsprachigen Raum Verschwörungstheorien und Verzerrungen immer noch eine große Rolle spielen." (Thomas Riegler, in: sehepunkte sehepunkte.de, Jg. 24, Heft 7-8, 2024)