This book examines the effect of social inequality, political influence and institutional design on the effectiveness of Latin American legal systems.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Daniel M. Brinks is assistant professor of government at the University of Texas at Austin, teaching comparative politics and public law, with an emphasis on politics and democracy in Latin America. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Notre Dame and a J.D., cum laude, from the University of Michigan Law School. Professor Brinks's research has appeared in journals such as Comparative Politics, Studies in Comparative International Development, Comparative Political Studies, and the Texas International Law Journal. Among his many awards and accolades, Brinks has received Honorable Mention in the Gabriel Almond Competition for Best Dissertation in Comparative Politics (2006), the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies Visiting Fellowship (2006(?)1;07), Eli J. and Helen Shaheen Notre Dame Graduate School Award in the Social Sciences (2004), the American Bar Foundation Doctoral Fellowship (2002(?)1;04), the Social Science Research Council International Dissertation Research Fellowship (2000(?)1;01), and a Fulbright Fellowship (2000(?)1;01, declined).
Inhaltsangabe
1. Effectiveness and inequality in the legal system 2. Charting injustice in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay 3. Informational and normative shifts across jurisdictions 4. Buenos Aires - political interference and informational dependence 5. Sao Paolo - normative autonomy and informational failures 6. Uruguay - strong results from a weak system 7. Cordoba - high levels of inequality in a strong system 8. Salvador da Bahia - social cleansing under political and judicial indifference 9. Binding leviathan.
1. Effectiveness and inequality in the legal system 2. Charting injustice in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay 3. Informational and normative shifts across jurisdictions 4. Buenos Aires - political interference and informational dependence 5. Sao Paolo - normative autonomy and informational failures 6. Uruguay - strong results from a weak system 7. Cordoba - high levels of inequality in a strong system 8. Salvador da Bahia - social cleansing under political and judicial indifference 9. Binding leviathan.
Es gelten unsere Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen: www.buecher.de/agb
Impressum
www.buecher.de ist ein Internetauftritt der buecher.de internetstores GmbH
Geschäftsführung: Monica Sawhney | Roland Kölbl | Günter Hilger
Sitz der Gesellschaft: Batheyer Straße 115 - 117, 58099 Hagen
Postanschrift: Bürgermeister-Wegele-Str. 12, 86167 Augsburg
Amtsgericht Hagen HRB 13257
Steuernummer: 321/5800/1497
USt-IdNr: DE450055826