This volume examines the core ideas of moral rationalism: the psychological thesis that reason is the source of moral judgment, the metaphysical thesis that it is the basis of moral requirements, the epistemological thesis that moral requirements are knowable a priori, and the normative thesis that moral requirements entail reasons for action.
This volume examines the core ideas of moral rationalism: the psychological thesis that reason is the source of moral judgment, the metaphysical thesis that it is the basis of moral requirements, the epistemological thesis that moral requirements are knowable a priori, and the normative thesis that moral requirements entail reasons for action.
Karen Jones is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Melbourne. She received her PhD from Cornell University. She has written extensively about trust, what it is, and when it is justified. She also writes on moral epistemology, the emotions, and rationality. Much of her work is from a feminist perspective. Francois Schroeter is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Melbourne, which he joined in 2003 after spending time at the University of Michigan and the ANU. He has written widely on metaethics and moral psychology.
Inhaltsangabe
* 1: François Schroeter, Karen Jones, and Laura Schroeter: Introduction * 2: Julia Markovits: Humanity as an End in Itself * 3: Michael Smith: Three Kinds of Moral Rationalism * 4: Karl Schafer: Constitutivism about Reasons: Autonomy and Understanding * 5: Nicholas Southwood: Constructing Practical Normativity * 6: Sarah Buss: Moral Requirements and Permissions, and the Requirements and Permissions of Reason * 7: Laura Schroeter and François Schroeter: Reasons and Justifiability * 8: Mark van Roojen: Rationalist Metaphysics, Semantics and Metasemantics * 9: Tristram McPherson: Naturalistic Moral Realism, Rationalism,and Non-Fundamental Epistemology * 10: Ram Neta: The Motivating Power of the A Priori Obvious * 11: Garrett Cullity: Stupid Goodness * 12: Alison Hills: What Does it Take to Act for Moral Reasons? * 13: Karen Jones: Towards a Trajectory-Dependent Model of (Human) Rational Agency * 14: Joshua May: The Limits of Emotion in Moral Judgment
* 1: François Schroeter, Karen Jones, and Laura Schroeter: Introduction * 2: Julia Markovits: Humanity as an End in Itself * 3: Michael Smith: Three Kinds of Moral Rationalism * 4: Karl Schafer: Constitutivism about Reasons: Autonomy and Understanding * 5: Nicholas Southwood: Constructing Practical Normativity * 6: Sarah Buss: Moral Requirements and Permissions, and the Requirements and Permissions of Reason * 7: Laura Schroeter and François Schroeter: Reasons and Justifiability * 8: Mark van Roojen: Rationalist Metaphysics, Semantics and Metasemantics * 9: Tristram McPherson: Naturalistic Moral Realism, Rationalism,and Non-Fundamental Epistemology * 10: Ram Neta: The Motivating Power of the A Priori Obvious * 11: Garrett Cullity: Stupid Goodness * 12: Alison Hills: What Does it Take to Act for Moral Reasons? * 13: Karen Jones: Towards a Trajectory-Dependent Model of (Human) Rational Agency * 14: Joshua May: The Limits of Emotion in Moral Judgment
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