Torin Alter makes a compelling case against the view that consciousness is a physical phenomenon. He argues that Frank Jackson's knowledge argument refutes all standard versions of physicalism, and leads to Russellian monism - the view there are intrinsic properties which both constitute consciousness and underlie properties described by physics.
Torin Alter makes a compelling case against the view that consciousness is a physical phenomenon. He argues that Frank Jackson's knowledge argument refutes all standard versions of physicalism, and leads to Russellian monism - the view there are intrinsic properties which both constitute consciousness and underlie properties described by physics.
Torin Alter is Professor of Philosophy at The University of Alabama, USA. He is author of articles in Mind, Philosophical Studies, and elsewhere; co-author of A Dialogue on Consciousness and The God Dialogues: A Philosophical Journey (both OUP); and co-editor of Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem: A Reader and Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism (both OUP).
Inhaltsangabe
Part I: The case for the epistemic gap 1: Introduction 2: The significance of structure 3: Structure, physical knowledge, and ignorance 4: Phenomenal knowledge without experience 5: Non-propositional phenomenal knowledge 6: Phenomenal representation Part II: The case for the modal gap 7: Deduction and necessity 8: Epistemic-modal bridge principles 9: The phenomenal concept strategy and Chalmers's dilemma 10: Consequences of social externalism 11: The conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts Part III: The case for the ontological gap 12: The supervenience requirement on physicalism 13: Two final objections 14: Two final objections 15: The knowledge argument, Russellian monism, and causal integration Conclusion
Part I: The case for the epistemic gap 1: Introduction 2: The significance of structure 3: Structure, physical knowledge, and ignorance 4: Phenomenal knowledge without experience 5: Non-propositional phenomenal knowledge 6: Phenomenal representation Part II: The case for the modal gap 7: Deduction and necessity 8: Epistemic-modal bridge principles 9: The phenomenal concept strategy and Chalmers's dilemma 10: Consequences of social externalism 11: The conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts Part III: The case for the ontological gap 12: The supervenience requirement on physicalism 13: Two final objections 14: Two final objections 15: The knowledge argument, Russellian monism, and causal integration Conclusion
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