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The Allied victory in World War II led to a feeling in the US of grandeur and omnipotence, as America became the most powerful country in recent history and US dollars were used to rebuild war-torn Europe. Russian acquisitiveness and ideology, however, soon changed the national euphoria to fear. As Washington reverberated with reports of a planned Communist monolith, national defence and negotiation from strength became the rallying cries of the country. This collection of essays explores the national security policies developed in response to this threat by the Truman and Eisenhower…mehr

Produktbeschreibung
The Allied victory in World War II led to a feeling in the US of grandeur and omnipotence, as America became the most powerful country in recent history and US dollars were used to rebuild war-torn Europe. Russian acquisitiveness and ideology, however, soon changed the national euphoria to fear. As Washington reverberated with reports of a planned Communist monolith, national defence and negotiation from strength became the rallying cries of the country. This collection of essays explores the national security policies developed in response to this threat by the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. More pointed and analytic than any other book on the subject, it shows clearly that the makers of Cold War policy were motivated by assumptions of a global Soviet danger. It also examines the nature of US security policy and points to the growing gap between the ends of a global security policy - to protect Western democracy from the 'Red Menace' - and the means - a nuclear strategy with limited applications.
Based on a conference at West Point, this volume explores the national security policies developed by the Truman and Eisenhower administrations in response to the threat of Soviet expansionism. More pointed and analytic than any other book on the subject, it shows clearly that the makers of Cold War policy were motivated by fear. It also examines the nature of U.S. security policy and points to the growing gap between the ends and the means of global security policy--the goal of protecting Western democracy from the "Red Menace" by using a nuclear strategy with limited applications. The contributors, including David Alan Rosenberg, Lloyd C. Gardner, Martin J. Sherwin, and Gary W. Reichard explore such issues as how dependence on nuclear weapons became the central doctrine of American foreign policy, the bureaucratic and political context of U.S. security, Eisenhower's ongoing disputes with Army and Navy leaders over the security issue, the objections of Democrats to the evolving security strategy, and the limits of Cold War policy, particularly how the viewing of the Third World through a U.S.-Soviet prism impeded us from developing a truly global security policy. Written in an accessible, journalistic style, The National Security makes available a wealth of information on the Cold War period and offers insights into fears that dominate political thinking to this day.
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