This Element, The Nature of Authority theory explains the nature of authoritative guidance. It posits that authoritative tellings are given by personal beings, rationally competent beings, under a plausible claim of right, imposed by beings with power, create obligations, and are backed by a reasonable threat of detriment to deter noncompliance.
This Element, The Nature of Authority theory explains the nature of authoritative guidance. It posits that authoritative tellings are given by personal beings, rationally competent beings, under a plausible claim of right, imposed by beings with power, create obligations, and are backed by a reasonable threat of detriment to deter noncompliance.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Preface Part I. Preliminary Considerations: 1. Introduction 2. The existence conditions of practical authority 3. Claims (1) through (7) and the sanctions thesis 4. The Razian theory of practical authority Part II. The Existence Conditions of Practical Authority 5. The constitutive properties of authoritative tellings 6. Other candidates for constitutive properties of authoritative tellings Part III. Claims (1) through (7) and the Sanctions Thesis: 7. Practical authority as telling people what to do 8. Practical authority as a source of reasons to comply 9. Practical authority as a personal relationship 10. Practical authority as rational 11. Practical authority as the power of will-imposition 12. Practical authority as grounded in a claim of right 13. Practical authority as giving rise to obligations 14. Must authoritative tellings create exclusionary reasons? 15. Objections - Of angels and emergency volunteers Conclusions Bibliography.
Preface Part I. Preliminary Considerations: 1. Introduction 2. The existence conditions of practical authority 3. Claims (1) through (7) and the sanctions thesis 4. The Razian theory of practical authority Part II. The Existence Conditions of Practical Authority 5. The constitutive properties of authoritative tellings 6. Other candidates for constitutive properties of authoritative tellings Part III. Claims (1) through (7) and the Sanctions Thesis: 7. Practical authority as telling people what to do 8. Practical authority as a source of reasons to comply 9. Practical authority as a personal relationship 10. Practical authority as rational 11. Practical authority as the power of will-imposition 12. Practical authority as grounded in a claim of right 13. Practical authority as giving rise to obligations 14. Must authoritative tellings create exclusionary reasons? 15. Objections - Of angels and emergency volunteers Conclusions Bibliography.
Es gelten unsere Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen: www.buecher.de/agb
Impressum
www.buecher.de ist ein Internetauftritt der buecher.de internetstores GmbH
Geschäftsführung: Monica Sawhney | Roland Kölbl | Günter Hilger
Sitz der Gesellschaft: Batheyer Straße 115 - 117, 58099 Hagen
Postanschrift: Bürgermeister-Wegele-Str. 12, 86167 Augsburg
Amtsgericht Hagen HRB 13257
Steuernummer: 321/5800/1497
USt-IdNr: DE450055826