What is it to be morally responsible for something? Recent philosophical work reveals considerable disagreement on the question. This volume presents twelve original essays from participants in these debates.
What is it to be morally responsible for something? Recent philosophical work reveals considerable disagreement on the question. This volume presents twelve original essays from participants in these debates.
Randolph Clarke is Professor of Philosophy at Florida State University. He is the author of Libertarian Accounts of Free Will (Oxford University Press, 2003), Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2014) and numerous articles on agency, free will, and moral responsibility. Michael McKenna is Professor and Keith Lehrer Chair in the Department of Philosophy and Center for the Philosophy of Freedom at the University of Arizona. He is the author of Conversation and Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2012) and numerous articles on free will and moral responsibility. Angela Smith is Roger Mudd Professor of Ethics and Director of the Roger Mudd Center for Ethics at Washington and Lee University. She is the author of numerous articles on moral responsibility, moral agency, and moral psychology.
Inhaltsangabe
* Acknowledgments * Notes on Contributors * Introduction * Part I. The Nature of Moral Responsibility: Some Frameworks * Chapter 1. Neal A. Tognazzini, The Strains of Involvement * Chapter 2. Michael J. Zimmerman, Varieties of Moral Responsibility * Chapter 3. Gideon Rosen, The Alethic Conception of Moral Responsibility * Chapter 4. T. M. Scanlon, Forms and Conditions of Responsibility * Part II. Quality of Will and the Deep Self * Chapter 5. David Shoemaker, Ecumenical Attributability * Chapter 6. Nomy Arpaly, Huckleberry Finn Revisited: Inverse Akrasia and Moral Ignorance * Chapter 7. Julia Driver, Appraisability, Attributability, and Moral Agency * Chapter 8. Holly M. Smith, Dual-Process Theory and Moral Responsibility * Part III. Responsibility in Practice: Communication, Substantive Responsibility, and Moral * Desert * Chapter 9. Coleen Macnamara, Blame, Communication, and Morally Responsible Agency * Chapter 10. George Sher, Responsibility, Conversation, and Communication * Chapter 11. Rahul Kumar, Contractualism and the Roots of Responsibility * Chapter 12. Derk Pereboom, A Notion of Moral Responsibility Immune to the Threat from * Causal Determination * Suggested Further Readings * Index
* Acknowledgments * Notes on Contributors * Introduction * Part I. The Nature of Moral Responsibility: Some Frameworks * Chapter 1. Neal A. Tognazzini, The Strains of Involvement * Chapter 2. Michael J. Zimmerman, Varieties of Moral Responsibility * Chapter 3. Gideon Rosen, The Alethic Conception of Moral Responsibility * Chapter 4. T. M. Scanlon, Forms and Conditions of Responsibility * Part II. Quality of Will and the Deep Self * Chapter 5. David Shoemaker, Ecumenical Attributability * Chapter 6. Nomy Arpaly, Huckleberry Finn Revisited: Inverse Akrasia and Moral Ignorance * Chapter 7. Julia Driver, Appraisability, Attributability, and Moral Agency * Chapter 8. Holly M. Smith, Dual-Process Theory and Moral Responsibility * Part III. Responsibility in Practice: Communication, Substantive Responsibility, and Moral * Desert * Chapter 9. Coleen Macnamara, Blame, Communication, and Morally Responsible Agency * Chapter 10. George Sher, Responsibility, Conversation, and Communication * Chapter 11. Rahul Kumar, Contractualism and the Roots of Responsibility * Chapter 12. Derk Pereboom, A Notion of Moral Responsibility Immune to the Threat from * Causal Determination * Suggested Further Readings * Index
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