The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics
Volume 3: Public Law and Legal Institutions
Herausgeber: Parisi, Francesco
The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics
Volume 3: Public Law and Legal Institutions
Herausgeber: Parisi, Francesco
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The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics applies the theoretical and empirical methods of economics to the study of law. Volume 3 surveys Public Law and Legal Institutions.
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The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics applies the theoretical and empirical methods of economics to the study of law. Volume 3 surveys Public Law and Legal Institutions.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Oxford Handbooks
- Verlag: Oxford University Press
- Seitenzahl: 592
- Erscheinungstermin: 27. November 2019
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 244mm x 170mm x 33mm
- Gewicht: 1084g
- ISBN-13: 9780198845171
- ISBN-10: 0198845170
- Artikelnr.: 55473258
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- 06621 890
- Oxford Handbooks
- Verlag: Oxford University Press
- Seitenzahl: 592
- Erscheinungstermin: 27. November 2019
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 244mm x 170mm x 33mm
- Gewicht: 1084g
- ISBN-13: 9780198845171
- ISBN-10: 0198845170
- Artikelnr.: 55473258
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- 06621 890
Francesco Parisi is the Oppenheimer Wolff and Donnelly Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota Law School and a Distinguished Professor of Public Finance at the University of Bologna. From 2002 to 2006 he held a Chair in Private Law at the University of Milan (Statale), where he was appointed Professore Ordinario per Chiara Fama. From 1993 to 2006 he taught at George Mason University where he served as Professor of Law & Director of the Law and Economics Program and as an Associate Director of the J.M. Buchanan Center for Political Economy. He has authored 18 books and approximately 200 papers in the field of law and economics. Professor Parisi is Editor-in-Chief of the Review of Law and Economics, Associate Editor of the International Review of Law and Economics, and served as Editor of the Supreme Court Economic Review. He is a member of the board of editors of the Journal of Public Choice, the American Journal of Comparative Law, and the Journal of Law, Economics and Policy.
* Part I: Constitutions, Statutes, and Regulations
* 1: Richard A. Epstein: Optimal Constitutional Structure
* 2: Tom Ginsburg: The Design of Constitutions
* 3: John M. de Figueiredo and Edward H. Stiglitz: Democratic
Rulemaking
* 4: Mariano-Florentino Cuellar and Jerry L. Mashaw: Regulatory
Decision-Making and Economic Analysis
* 5: Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfield: Economics of Federalism
* 6: Daniel Shaviro: Economics of Tax Law
* Part II: Civil Process and Litigation
* 7: Ben Depoorter and Paul H. Rubin: Judge-Made Law and the Common Law
Process
* 8: Robert G. Bone: Economics of Civil Procedure
* 9: Chris W. Sanchirico: Law and Economics of Evidence
* 10: Bruce H. Kobayashi: Economics of Litigation
* 11: Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum: Settlement and
Trial
* 12: Winard Emons: Legal Fees and Lawyers' Compensation
* 13: Albert Yoon: The Legal Profession and the Market for Lawyers
* 14: Talia Fisher: Law and Economics of Alternative Dispute Resolution
* Part III: Crime and Punishment
* 15: Isaac Ehrlich: Economics of Criminal Law
* 16: Keith N. Hylton: Economics of Criminal Procedure
* 17: Anthony A. Braga: Guns and Crime
* 18: Roger Bowles: Prosecutorial Strategies
* Part IV: Beyond National Legal Systems
* 19: Geoffrey Parsons Miller: Economics of Ancient Legal Systems
* 20: Daniel Klerman: Economics of Legal History
* 21: Alan Sykes and Andrew Guzman: Economics of International Law
* 22: Paul B. Stephan: Enforcement of International Law
* 23: W. Mark C. Weidemaier and Mitu Gulati: International Finance and
Sovereign Debt
* 24: Joel P. Trachtman: Economics of International Organizations
* 25: Erin O'Hara O'Connor: Choice of Law and Conflict of Laws
* 1: Richard A. Epstein: Optimal Constitutional Structure
* 2: Tom Ginsburg: The Design of Constitutions
* 3: John M. de Figueiredo and Edward H. Stiglitz: Democratic
Rulemaking
* 4: Mariano-Florentino Cuellar and Jerry L. Mashaw: Regulatory
Decision-Making and Economic Analysis
* 5: Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfield: Economics of Federalism
* 6: Daniel Shaviro: Economics of Tax Law
* Part II: Civil Process and Litigation
* 7: Ben Depoorter and Paul H. Rubin: Judge-Made Law and the Common Law
Process
* 8: Robert G. Bone: Economics of Civil Procedure
* 9: Chris W. Sanchirico: Law and Economics of Evidence
* 10: Bruce H. Kobayashi: Economics of Litigation
* 11: Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum: Settlement and
Trial
* 12: Winard Emons: Legal Fees and Lawyers' Compensation
* 13: Albert Yoon: The Legal Profession and the Market for Lawyers
* 14: Talia Fisher: Law and Economics of Alternative Dispute Resolution
* Part III: Crime and Punishment
* 15: Isaac Ehrlich: Economics of Criminal Law
* 16: Keith N. Hylton: Economics of Criminal Procedure
* 17: Anthony A. Braga: Guns and Crime
* 18: Roger Bowles: Prosecutorial Strategies
* Part IV: Beyond National Legal Systems
* 19: Geoffrey Parsons Miller: Economics of Ancient Legal Systems
* 20: Daniel Klerman: Economics of Legal History
* 21: Alan Sykes and Andrew Guzman: Economics of International Law
* 22: Paul B. Stephan: Enforcement of International Law
* 23: W. Mark C. Weidemaier and Mitu Gulati: International Finance and
Sovereign Debt
* 24: Joel P. Trachtman: Economics of International Organizations
* 25: Erin O'Hara O'Connor: Choice of Law and Conflict of Laws
* Part I: Constitutions, Statutes, and Regulations
* 1: Richard A. Epstein: Optimal Constitutional Structure
* 2: Tom Ginsburg: The Design of Constitutions
* 3: John M. de Figueiredo and Edward H. Stiglitz: Democratic
Rulemaking
* 4: Mariano-Florentino Cuellar and Jerry L. Mashaw: Regulatory
Decision-Making and Economic Analysis
* 5: Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfield: Economics of Federalism
* 6: Daniel Shaviro: Economics of Tax Law
* Part II: Civil Process and Litigation
* 7: Ben Depoorter and Paul H. Rubin: Judge-Made Law and the Common Law
Process
* 8: Robert G. Bone: Economics of Civil Procedure
* 9: Chris W. Sanchirico: Law and Economics of Evidence
* 10: Bruce H. Kobayashi: Economics of Litigation
* 11: Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum: Settlement and
Trial
* 12: Winard Emons: Legal Fees and Lawyers' Compensation
* 13: Albert Yoon: The Legal Profession and the Market for Lawyers
* 14: Talia Fisher: Law and Economics of Alternative Dispute Resolution
* Part III: Crime and Punishment
* 15: Isaac Ehrlich: Economics of Criminal Law
* 16: Keith N. Hylton: Economics of Criminal Procedure
* 17: Anthony A. Braga: Guns and Crime
* 18: Roger Bowles: Prosecutorial Strategies
* Part IV: Beyond National Legal Systems
* 19: Geoffrey Parsons Miller: Economics of Ancient Legal Systems
* 20: Daniel Klerman: Economics of Legal History
* 21: Alan Sykes and Andrew Guzman: Economics of International Law
* 22: Paul B. Stephan: Enforcement of International Law
* 23: W. Mark C. Weidemaier and Mitu Gulati: International Finance and
Sovereign Debt
* 24: Joel P. Trachtman: Economics of International Organizations
* 25: Erin O'Hara O'Connor: Choice of Law and Conflict of Laws
* 1: Richard A. Epstein: Optimal Constitutional Structure
* 2: Tom Ginsburg: The Design of Constitutions
* 3: John M. de Figueiredo and Edward H. Stiglitz: Democratic
Rulemaking
* 4: Mariano-Florentino Cuellar and Jerry L. Mashaw: Regulatory
Decision-Making and Economic Analysis
* 5: Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfield: Economics of Federalism
* 6: Daniel Shaviro: Economics of Tax Law
* Part II: Civil Process and Litigation
* 7: Ben Depoorter and Paul H. Rubin: Judge-Made Law and the Common Law
Process
* 8: Robert G. Bone: Economics of Civil Procedure
* 9: Chris W. Sanchirico: Law and Economics of Evidence
* 10: Bruce H. Kobayashi: Economics of Litigation
* 11: Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum: Settlement and
Trial
* 12: Winard Emons: Legal Fees and Lawyers' Compensation
* 13: Albert Yoon: The Legal Profession and the Market for Lawyers
* 14: Talia Fisher: Law and Economics of Alternative Dispute Resolution
* Part III: Crime and Punishment
* 15: Isaac Ehrlich: Economics of Criminal Law
* 16: Keith N. Hylton: Economics of Criminal Procedure
* 17: Anthony A. Braga: Guns and Crime
* 18: Roger Bowles: Prosecutorial Strategies
* Part IV: Beyond National Legal Systems
* 19: Geoffrey Parsons Miller: Economics of Ancient Legal Systems
* 20: Daniel Klerman: Economics of Legal History
* 21: Alan Sykes and Andrew Guzman: Economics of International Law
* 22: Paul B. Stephan: Enforcement of International Law
* 23: W. Mark C. Weidemaier and Mitu Gulati: International Finance and
Sovereign Debt
* 24: Joel P. Trachtman: Economics of International Organizations
* 25: Erin O'Hara O'Connor: Choice of Law and Conflict of Laws