Survey of contents:
I. Case Studies
1. Evolution of European institutions
Dieter Schmidtchen and Bernard Steunenberg: Comitology and the Legislator's Dilemma: On the Architecture of Decisionmaking in the European Union (Comments : Werner Güth and Mathias Sutter) - Bernd Irlenbusch, Ulrike Leopold-Wildburger, Jörg Schütze and Mathias Sutter: The Effects of Communication in the Voting Procedure of the Stability and Growth Pact in EMU (Comments: Marlies Ahlert)
2. Internet Institutions
Axel Ockenfels: New Institutional Structures on the Internet: The Economic Design of Online Auctions (Comments: Bodo Vogt) - Ralph Peters: On the Design of Electronic Markets (Comments: Sabine Kröger)
II. Institutional evolution and its behavioural foundations
3. Models of institutional evolution
Siegfried Berninghaus: Evolution of Conventions - Some Theoretical and Experimental Aspects (Comments: Dennis Dittrich) - Tone Arnold: On the Formation of Clubs (Comments: Björn Frank) - Werner Güth and Axel Ockenfels: The Coevolution of Trust and Institutions in Anonymous and Non-anonymous Communities (Comments: Roland Kirstein)
4. Behavioural foundations of institutional evolution
Stefan Napel: Modelling Bilateral Bargaining: From Perfect to Bounded Rationality (Comments: Gerlinde Fellner) - Iris Bohnet, Steffen Huck and Jean-Robert Tyran: Instinct or Incentive to be Trustworthy? The Role of Informational Institutions (Comments: Bernd Lahno)
The Political Economy of Institutional Evolution. Yearbook for New Political Economy. Volume 21.
In this volume economists with a background in game and decision theory apply their methods to central issues of the political economy of institutional evolution. The discussion ranges from abstract models of, for instance, the evolution of clubs and of conventions to quite specific case studies of real world institutions such as legislation in the European union and internet trade. It combines results of experimental economics with theoretical considerations.
Die Welt entwickelt sich und mit ihr unsere Institutionen. Die Neuere Politische Ökonomie hat zum Verständnis des Prozesses institutioneller Evolution Wesentliches beizutragen. Das vorliegende Werk leistet einen solchen Beitrag unter besonderer Berücksichtigung mathematischer Spiel- und Entscheidungstheorie sowie experimenteller Ökonomik.
I. Case Studies
1. Evolution of European institutions
Dieter Schmidtchen and Bernard Steunenberg: Comitology and the Legislator's Dilemma: On the Architecture of Decisionmaking in the European Union (Comments : Werner Güth and Mathias Sutter) - Bernd Irlenbusch, Ulrike Leopold-Wildburger, Jörg Schütze and Mathias Sutter: The Effects of Communication in the Voting Procedure of the Stability and Growth Pact in EMU (Comments: Marlies Ahlert)
2. Internet Institutions
Axel Ockenfels: New Institutional Structures on the Internet: The Economic Design of Online Auctions (Comments: Bodo Vogt) - Ralph Peters: On the Design of Electronic Markets (Comments: Sabine Kröger)
II. Institutional evolution and its behavioural foundations
3. Models of institutional evolution
Siegfried Berninghaus: Evolution of Conventions - Some Theoretical and Experimental Aspects (Comments: Dennis Dittrich) - Tone Arnold: On the Formation of Clubs (Comments: Björn Frank) - Werner Güth and Axel Ockenfels: The Coevolution of Trust and Institutions in Anonymous and Non-anonymous Communities (Comments: Roland Kirstein)
4. Behavioural foundations of institutional evolution
Stefan Napel: Modelling Bilateral Bargaining: From Perfect to Bounded Rationality (Comments: Gerlinde Fellner) - Iris Bohnet, Steffen Huck and Jean-Robert Tyran: Instinct or Incentive to be Trustworthy? The Role of Informational Institutions (Comments: Bernd Lahno)
The Political Economy of Institutional Evolution. Yearbook for New Political Economy. Volume 21.
In this volume economists with a background in game and decision theory apply their methods to central issues of the political economy of institutional evolution. The discussion ranges from abstract models of, for instance, the evolution of clubs and of conventions to quite specific case studies of real world institutions such as legislation in the European union and internet trade. It combines results of experimental economics with theoretical considerations.
Die Welt entwickelt sich und mit ihr unsere Institutionen. Die Neuere Politische Ökonomie hat zum Verständnis des Prozesses institutioneller Evolution Wesentliches beizutragen. Das vorliegende Werk leistet einen solchen Beitrag unter besonderer Berücksichtigung mathematischer Spiel- und Entscheidungstheorie sowie experimenteller Ökonomik.